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DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND DISCRIMINATION: A PUBLIC
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION

The constitutions of approximately half of the states authorize the
electorate to initiate and enact legislation without the concurrence or
assistance of the state legislature.' Although there is substantial variation in the frequency with which the People exercise their direct lawmaking power, every year several important issues are decided by substitutive
plebiscite in nearly all of these states. 2 Moreover, initiative-forced reforms include some of the turning points in American legal history: women's suffrage, the abolition of the poll tax, the establishment of the
eight-hour work day, and campaign finance regulations. 3
Despite the importance of direct democracy in American lawmaking, legal academics have only recently begun to notice its existence. 4
I. Citizens may initiate and enact ordinary legislation in 21 states (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming).
See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 29 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 330 (1992); THOMAS
E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 51

(1989);

DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE

UNITED STATES 38-40 (1984); DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 95-97 (1989); Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.

1503, 1587-88 (1990). In these 21 states plus Kentucky, Maryland, and New Mexico, voters can
require the legislature to obtain the approval of the electorate before its enactments become law.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra at 336; CRONIN, supra; MAGLEBY, supra; Eule,
supra. Florida, Illinois, and fifteen of the states that allow statutory initiatives also permit citizens to
initiate a state constitutional amendment (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and

South Dakota).

THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,

supra at 330;

CRONIN,

supra; MAGELBY,

supra; Eule, supra. (In Illinois, the constitutional amendments may pertain only to the Legislative
Article, Eule, supra, at 1509 n.22.) The District of Columbia also provides for voter initiatives and
popular referenda. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-281 (1987); CRONIN, Supra.
2. Five states have each had more than 100 statutory and constitutional initiatives qualify for
the ballot since direct democracy has been available in the state: Oregon (227 initiatives proposed in
1902-79); California (160 in 1911-79); North Dakota (141 in 1914-79); Colorado (125 in 1910-79);
and Arizona (112 in 1911-79). At the other end of the spectrum, four states that permit initiatives
have each had fewer than 10 initiatives qualify for the ballot: Wyoming (0 initiatives proposed in
1968-79); Illinois (2 in 1970-79); Florida (2 in 1968-79); and Utah (8 in 1900-79). MAGLEBY, supra
note 1, at 71; CRONIN, supra note 1, at 51. See also SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 211-15 (initiative and
referendum election results for 1987-88), 287-94 (statewide initiatives passed by voters in 1970-86).
The reasons for this variation are not clear. Magleby has suggested that the states qualifying
the highest number of measures for the ballot are those with the lowest signature thresholds.
MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 42. Other scholars contend that "a state's historical tradition and political culture" may be the critical determinant of the frequency with which direct lawmaking is undertaken. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Constitutionalityof the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REV.
637, 662 (1980); Eule, supra note 1, at 1509 n.22.
3. CRONIN, supra note 1, at 50-52, 59, 97-98, 199; Ronald J. Allen, The National Initiative
Proposal:A PreliminaryAnalysis, 58 NEB. L. REV. 965, 1009-17, 1021-26 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 3; Anthony S. Alperin & Kathline J. King, Ballot Box Planning:
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Two related questions have quickly occupied center stage. Are plebiscites more likely than representative processes to produce laws that disadvantage racial minorities? And should the courts, which have not
historically varied their analyses because of a law's popular origin, begin
to employ different standards when reviewing the enactments of plebiscites and legislatures? Thus far, scholars have largely agreed that the

Land Use Planning Through the Initiative Process in California, 21 Sw.U. L. REV. 1 (1992); Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978);
Charles L. Black Jr., National Lawmaking by Initiative? Let's Think Twice, 8 HuM. RTS. 28 (Fall
1979); Nick Brestoff, Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S.CAL. L.
REV. 922 (1975); Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347 (1985) (book
review); Marc Slonim & James H. Lowe, Comment, Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular
Vote, 55 WASH. L. REV. 175 (1979) [hereinafter Judicial Review]; Kathryn A. Dunwoody, Note,
Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa: Rezoning by Initiative and Landowners' Due Process
Rights, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1107 (1982); Eule, supra note 1; James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The
Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43
(1983); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S.CAL. L. REV. 733 (1988) [hereinafter Lousy Lawmaking];
Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites. Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86
MICH. L. REV. 930 (1988); James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election, Judicial Review
of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298 (1989); Herbert Graham, Note, The
Direct Initiative Process: Have Unconstitutional Methods of Presenting the Issues Prejudiced Its Future?, 27 UCLA L. REV. 433 (1979); Alexander G. Gray, Jr. & Thomas R. Kiley, The Initiative and
Referendum in Massachusetts, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 27 (1991); Priscilla F. Gunn, Initiatives and
Referendums: Direct Democracy and Minority Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135 (1981); Randall L.
Hodgkinson, Comment, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Power Over Direct Legislation in Arizona, 23 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1111 (1991); Douglas H. Hsiao, Note, Invisible Cities: The Constitutional
Status of Direct Democracy in a Democratic Republic, 41 DUKE L. J. 1267 (1992); David J. Jordan,
Comment, Constitutional Constraints on Initiative and Referendum, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1143 (1979);
Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public
Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505 (1982) [hereinafter Lowenstein,
Campaign Spending]; Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30
UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983) [hereinafter Lowenstein, Single-Subject]; Daniel Lowenstein & Robert
Stern, The First Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition Circulators: A Dissenting View and a Proposal, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 175 (1989); Randy M. Mastro, Deborah C. Costlow & Heidi P.
Sanders, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process Through Media Spending and What to Do About It, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 315 (1980); Douglas C. Michael, Note, Judicial
Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendments, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 461 (1980); Douglas C.
Michael, Note, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in Voter Protection, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 1216 (1983); Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-78); Elizabeth A.
McNellie, Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Popularly Enacted Legislation, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1989) [hereinafter Extrinsic Aids]; Mark A. Nitikman, Note, Instant Planning-Land Use Regulation by Initiative in California, 61 S.CAL. L. REV. 497 (1988); Note, The
Referendum as a "Republican Form of Government, " 24 HARV. L. REV. 141 (1910); Craig N. Oren,
Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CAL. L. REV. 74 (1976); Lawrence G.
Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1978); James J. Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group
Legislation: Postscript to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881 (1970); John S. Shockley,
Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377 (1985); Sirico, supra note 2; Cass R.
Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 127.
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answer to both questions is "yes."
In this Article, I argue that the answer to both questions is "no."
First, I use public choice theory6 to show that a rationally self-interested
racial minority's preference between representative and direct lawmaking
processes is a difficult empirical question and cannot confidently be resolved on the strength of a priori reasoning. My response to the first
question, therefore, is best understood as a refutation of confident claims
that racial minorities are better served by representative than direct lawmaking processes, than as an argument that direct lawmaking processes
are superior to representative ones in this regard.
I then consider commentators' suggestions that plebiscitary legislation should begin to receive "a harder judicial look" under equal protection doctrine than the enactments of representative bodies. I contend
that such disparate judicial treatment is neither necessary nor desirable,
even if plebiscites were empirically found to be systematically less likely
than representative bodies to enact legislation that disadvantages racial
minorities.
My discussion focuses on substitutive plebiscites, in which the voters
7
completely bypass the legislative and executive branches of government.
This is typically thought to be direct democracy in its purest form. My
discussion further centers on racial minorities because the persistence of
racial prejudice and of the correlation between race and poverty in our
society may make those interest groups unusually vulnerable to
majoritarian oppression and unusually incapable of capturing lawmaking
processes. It is important to keep in mind, however, that racial minorities are only one type of interest group that is affected by differences in,
and the relationship between, the direct and representative lawmaking
5. The only legal scholars even to approximate a dissent on either of these questions have been
Allen, supra note 3, Briffault, supra note 4, and Gillette, supra note 4.
6. Whether and how "public choice theory" differs from "positive political theory" is a matter
on which there appears to be little consensus. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 6-7 (1991); Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickley,
Foreword: Positive PoliticalTheory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992). I prefer the former term
in the present context because it appears to be more frequently used in reference to the theorists (e.g.,
Buchanan, Tullock, Mueller) on whose work I most heavily rely.
7. Julian Eule has coined highly useful terms to denote the two major types of plebiscites:
"substitutive direct democracy" and "complementary direct democracy." Eule, supra note 1, at
1510-13.
The enactments of substitutive plebiscites are popularly referred to as "initiatives." Some initiatives, however, are indirect in that they are submitted to the representative legislature before being
placed on the ballot. See id. at 1510-11.
Popularly referred to as "referenda," complementary plebiscites come in three variants distinguished by who or what prompts the referral to the legislature. Id. at 1512-13.
For purposes of this Article, "plebiscite" means only direct initiatives, unless otherwise

specified.
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processes. As modem equal protection doctrine makes clear, we tolerate
majority "oppression" of some interest groups more than others. And
we differentially permit interest groups to impose costs on the majority
through the passage of rent-seeking legislation.
Part I discusses the important but overlooked reciprocity of effect of
any systematic differences in the two types of lawmaking processes. To
the extent that a given difference in the two lawmaking processes makes
it more difficult for a racial minority to block disadvantageous'legislation
in a plebiscitary than in a representative process, that same difference
will make it easier for the minority to pass advantageous legislation in a
plebiscitary than in a representative process.
Part II examines the major differences in the direct and representative lawmaking processes: (1) state legislatures, but not plebiscites, are
nearly always bicameral and their enactments subject to an executive
veto; (2) representatives have more opportunities for logrolling than do
plebiscite voters; (3) the author of the initiative almost always and almost
entirely sets the agenda in a plebiscite, while agenda-setting in a representative body is a much more complicated process; and (4) representatives'
votes are public, while plebiscite votes are anonymous. Employing public choice theory, I show that whether these differences result in plebiscites being systematically more likely than representative bodies to enact
legislation that disadvantages racial minorities is a much closer theoretical question than previous commentators have thought. Part II concludes by addressing the claims that representative bodies engage in more
deliberation than do plebiscites, and that they therefore are systematically less likely than plebiscites to enact legislation that disadvantages
racial minorities. I determine that both this premise and conclusion are
seriously flawed.
Part III considers what, if anything, should be done if plebiscites
were empirically found to be systematically more likely than representative bodies to enact legislation that disadvantages racial minorities. I
show first that simply abolishing plebiscites is neither politically feasible
nor especially desirable. I then take up scholars' suggestions that the
courts should engage in more intrusive equal protection review of plebiscitary legislation than of legislatures' enactments.
Close examination reveals these proposals for "a harder judicial
look" to be misguided for three reasons. First, there is little evidence
that any differences in the two lawmaking processes will make it more
difficultfor courts to identify unconstitutionally discriminatory legislation
under existing equal protection standards if it is enacted by a plebiscite
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rather than by a representative legislature. Second, these proposals
seemingly misunderstand the nature and operation of the intent test in
modem equal protection law. Third, implicit in these suggestions is a
doctrine of due process of lawmaking, which the Court and most commentators have in other contexts considered to be neither workable nor
desirable.
I conclude that those who, despite the analysis in Parts I and II,
remain interested in providing racial minorities still greater protection
from potentially disadvantageous plebiscitary legislation, might more
productively focus their attention on remedying any perceived defects or
weaknesses in existing plebiscitary procedures than on altering the standard of judicial review.

I.

RACIAL MINORITIES AND THE LAWMAKING PROCESS: PASSING
VERSUS BLOCKING

There is a facial attractiveness to the claim that "the more direct
democracy becomes, the more threatening it is [to racial minorities]." 8
By definition, a minority group will not itself have enough plebiscite
votes either to pass laws that would advantage it or to stop legislation
that would disadvantage it. A minority group may, however, be a sufficiently important sector of a legislator's constituency that her desire for
reelection or advancement may induce her to be responsive to the group's
interests and concerns.
In recent years, several legal scholars have undertaken detailed theoretical comparisons of the representative and direct lawmaking processes
in order to assess more carefully their relative impacts on various interest
groups. 9 Derrick Bell10 and Julian Eule" have each contended that,
from the perspective of racial minorities, representative democracy has
several important advantages over its more direct counterpart.12
8. Bell, supra note 4, at 1.
9. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 4; Bell, supra note 4; Eule, supra note !; Gillette, supra note 4.
10. Bell, supra note 4.
11. Eule, supra note 1.
12. Clay Gillette has recently compared the representative and direct lawmaking processes in
terms of their relative capacities "to serve public interest." Gillette, supra note 4, at 932. He defined
"public interest" as "broadly (if vaguely) to comprise behavior that minimizes expropriation (rentseeking) or maximizes coordination." Id. at 933.
Gillette admitted having some difficulty defining "public interest," but believed that his definition "does contain some substantive requirements, primarily by excluding certain conduct or motives." Id. at 932. He more broadly defined "public interest" to mean that "individual
decisionmakers acting in the public interest would be able to justify their decisions by reference to
the resulting increased welfare for society at large." Id. Gillette noted, however, that he does "not
mean a single conception of the good on which all informed individuals would agree." Id.
Gillette undertook "to indicate the existence of incentives in the legislative and plebiscitary
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It is uncontroversially true that representative and direct lawmaking
processes differ in several important respects.1 3 Contrary to the apparent
consensus in the literature, however, these differences do not constitute a
priori reasons for a racial minority generally to prefer representative to
direct democracy.
One important concern of a racial minority is blocking the passage
of disadvantageous legislation. By "disadvantageous" legislation, I mean
legislation of which the rationally self-interested median member of the
minority group would not approve, presumably including unconstitutionally discriminatory legislation. Let us assume, arguendo, that the differences in the two lawmaking processes cause plebiscites to be
systematically more likely than representative bodies to enact legislation
that disadvantages a racial minority.' 4 That is, let us assume that it is
systematically more difficult for a racial minority to block disadvantageous legislation in a plebiscite than in a representative lawmaking process. If correct, this assumption taken alone leads to the conclusion that
a racial minority is better off with representative than with direct
lawmaking.
It is critical to note, however, that blocking disadvantageous legislation is only one goal of any interest group. A racial minority will also be
concerned with passing legislation that advantages it-that is, with passing legislation of which the rationally self-interested median member of
the minority group would approve, including rent-seeking legislation. To
the extent that a given difference in the two lawmaking processes makes
it more difficult for a racial minority to block disadvantageouslegislation
in a plebiscitary than in a representative process, that same difference
will make it easier for the minority to pass advantageous legislation in a
plebiscitary than in a representative process.
processes that would tend to favor conduct consistent with public or private interest." Id. at 939.
He concluded that "at least in discrete areas with identifiable characteristics, criticisms of plebiscites
both understate the capacity of participation and overstate the capacity of legislative processes to
serve public interest." Id. at 932.
Although some of Gillette's many insights will prove useful in the course of this Article, his
project is fundamentally distinguishable by his chosen basis for comparing the two lawmaking
processes: realization of "the public interest" rather than the likelihood that legislation that disadvantages a racial minority is enacted.
13. State legislatures, but not plebiscites, are nearly always bicameral and their enactments are
subject to an executive veto, see infra Part II.A.; representatives have more opportunities for logrolling than do plebiscite voters, see infra Part II.B.; the agenda-setting process is more complicated in a
representative body than in a plebiscite, see infra Part II.C.;and representatives' votes are open,
while plebiscite votes are anonymous, see infra Part I.D. More controversial is the claim that representative bodies engage in more deliberation than do plebiscites, see infra Part II.E.
14.

This is the claim of both Derrick Bell, see supra note 4, and Julian Eule, see supra note 1.
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Sometimes, of course, a "racist"' majority group may exist whose
preferences are as intense as those of the racial minority group. In this
case, the minority group is unlikely to be able to block disadvantageous
legislation or to pass advantageous legislation under either lawmaking
process. If the racists constitute a minority group no greater in number
than the racial minority group, however, success for either group depends on winning over sufficient numbers of the third, racially indifferent
group. In this case, any difficulty that a racial minority encounters when
trying to block disadvantageous legislation in a plebiscitary process will
be similarly encountered by any racist minority that tries to block plebiscitary legislation that advantages a racial minority. Thus, any difference
in the two lawmaking processes that makes it more difficult for a racial
minority to block disadvantageous legislation in a direct than a representative process will have an equally strong positive effect when the racial
minority is interested in passing advantageous legislation.
In light of the above analysis, a racial minority is likely generally to
prefer direct to representative democracy if, ceterisparibus,1

6

(1) the ra-

cial minority will more frequently be seeking to pass advantageous legislation than block disadvantageous legislation in the direct lawmaking
process, and the ratio of the racial minority's passing to blocking activity
is smaller within the representative than within the direct lawmaking
process; or (2) the racial minority will more frequently be seeking to
block disadvantageous legislation than pass advantageous legislation in
the direct lawmaking process, and the ratio of the racial minority's
blocking to passing activity is greater within the representative than
within the direct lawmaking process.' 7
These comparisons require empirical data that are not currently
available and may not be easily gathered. First, there is the task of classifying proposed legislation as "advantageous," "disadvantageous," or
"neutral" with respect to racial minorities.18 One can imagine many issues on which reasonable and rationally self-interested members of a racial minority may disagree in their categorizations: bussing, affirmative
action, and English-only laws, to name but a few.
15. I use this term simply to denote those who, for whatever reason, oppose legislation that
advantages, and/or support legislation that disadvantages, a racial minority. I do not mean to convey any normative judgment about such views or those who hold them.
16. Perhaps the most important thing being held constant here is intensity of preference with
regard to blocking or passing any particularpiece of legislation.
17. Whether the racial minority considers it more important to block disadvantageous legislation or pass advantageous legislation will, of course, depend in part on whether the group perceives
the status quo as disadvantageous or advantageous more frequently and on issues of greater import.
18. For my definitions of these terms for purposes of this Article, see text accompanying notes
13-15.
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Second, even if this classification problem is adequately resolved,
there is the difficulty of measuring and comparing the frequency with
which a racial minority seeks to pass advantageous or block disadvantageous legislation in the two processes. In the case of plebiscites, one
could simply count the number of advantageous and disadvantageous
measures that appear on ballots. But even this measure is not sensitive to
earlier but equally important blocking and passing activity that occurs,
for example, while the signatures necessary to put a measure on the ballot are gathered (or not). In the case of a representative body, the counting task is made still more difficult by the greater fluidity and complexity
of the lawmaking process: Legislation is continuously born, altered, and
killed on the floor of each chamber, in committee meetings, and in the
proverbial cloakroom. Even if one arrives at a satisfactory measure of
blocking and passing activity in the representative body, one must then
somehow ensure that the chosen measures of plebiscitary activity are
truly comparable.
In sum, whether a rationally self-interested racial minority (or other
interest group) ought in general to prefer representative to direct lawmaking processes is a difficult empirical question and cannot be resolved
on the strength of a priori reasoning. Whether a racial minority is likely
to prefer a representative to a direct lawmaking process in a given instance, however, will depend on (1) whether the racial minority is attempting to block disadvantageous legislation or pass advantageous
legislation, and (2) whether differences in the representative and direct
lawmaking processes cause plebiscites to be more (or less) likely than
representative bodies to enact legislation that disadvantages (or advantages) the racial minority. The first is an uncomplicated empirical inquiry. The second is the focus of the next Part.
II.

REPRESENTATIVE VERSUS DIRECT DEMOCRACY

There are six major, apparent differences in the representative and
direct lawmaking processes: bicameralism, the executive veto, logrolling
opportunities, agenda control, open voting, and capacity for deliberation.
In this Part, I primarily consider the extent to which each of these differences 19 in the two processes will cause plebiscites to be more likely than
representative bodies to enact legislation that disadvantages racial minorities.20 I conclude that scholars have greatly overestimated the likely ef19. I challenge Bell's and Eule's claims that representative bodies are likely to engage in more
deliberation than plebiscites. See infra Part II.E. I do not contest the presence or claimed extent of
the other apparent differences in the two lawmaking processes.
20. My discussion focuses on the ability of racial minorities to block disadvantageous legisla-
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fect of these differences on the ability of a racial minority to block
disadvantageous legislation in a representative versus a direct lawmaking
process.
A. Bicameralism and the Executive Veto
Perhaps the most obvious differences between plebiscitary and representative lawmaking processes at the state level are the bicameralism
of, and the availability of the executive veto in, the latter but not the
former. 21 I begin my analysis of the effects of these two differences begins by employing a stylized approach developed by Buchanan and Tullock, which sets theoretical minimum bounds on the size of groups
necessary to block and enact legislation. I later relax these assumptions
and conclude that very similar percentages of voters are likely to be necessary in a plebiscite and a representative body both to block legislation
that disadvantages a racial minority and to enact legislation that advantages it.
In theory, slightly more than one-quarterof the voters could control
a unicameral representative legislature: The approval of only a majority
of the representatives is required to pass legislation, and each representative in the majority need be elected by only a majority of the voters in her
district. 22 The addition of a second chamber will likely increase the
tion (rather than their ability to pass advantageous legislation) for two major reasons: (1) the courts
have a greater role to play when reviewing legislation that has been enacted versus blocked; and (2)
previous scholars have contended that plebiscites are more likely than representative processes to
produce laws that disadvantage racial minorities. Because of the reciprocity of effect of any systematic differences in the representative and direct lawmaking processes (see Part I supra), it does not
seem necessary to discuss both the legislative blocking and passing ability of racial minorities.
21. Every state except Nebraska has a bicameral legislature. In 1934, Nebraska voters adopted
a citizen-initiated constitutional amendment establishing a unicameral legislature. CRONIN, supra
note 1, at 33. The governor of every state except North Carolina has a veto power over enactments
by the legislature, although the scope of this power varies greatly. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 1, at 49-50; MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 47; DANIEL R. MANDELKER, DAWN
CLARK NETSCH, PETER W. SALSICH, JR., JUDITH WELCH WAGNER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 701-18 (3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT]. No governor has a veto over statutory or constitutional initiatives.
MAGLEBY, supra note I, at 47.

At the local level, all representative lawmaking bodies are unicameral and there is no analogue
of the gubernatorial veto. CRONIN, supra note 1, at 33; STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra, at
27-31.
Although plebiscites occur at the local as well as the state level, and a comparison of the two
legislative processes at the local level would therefore be useful, I restrict my analysis to the more
difficult case in which the alternative to the plebiscite is a representative body with special "filters"
(bicameralism and the executive veto) against majority tyranny. To the extent that even these representative bodies are not found to provide racial minorities better protection against disadvantageous
legislation than plebiscites, the case will be even stronger with regard to local representative lawmaking bodies.
22. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 220-22 (1962); Harold H. Bruff, Legislative For-
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number of voters necessary to pass legislation by a representative body. 23
To the extent that the members of the two chambers are elected from
identical jurisdictions, the same one-quarter of the voters could, in theory, control a bicameral representative legislature. The more diverse the
jurisdictions are from which the members of the two chambers are
elected, the greater the number of voters that will be necessary to capture
both houses of the legislature and, therefore, to pass legislation. 24 If each
voter gets to elect a representative in both chambers, however, and representatives are elected on a geographical basis, no more than 39 percent of
the voters could, in theory, be necessary to pass legislation, even assum25
ing the most diverse possible jurisdictions.
Thus, only approximately 39 percent of the voters could, in theory,
be necessary (in the absence of an executive veto) for a bicameral representative body to pass legislation that disadvantages a racial minority. In
contrast, a simple majority of voters is always necessary for a plebiscite
to enact legislation. Thus, a greater percentage of voters could, in theory, be necessary for a plebiscite than for a bicameral representative legislature to pass legislation that disadvantages a racial minority.
Under similar assumptions, a greater percentage of voters could, in
theory, also be required for a plebiscite than for a bicameral representative body to block legislation that disadvantages a racial minority. In a
mality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 219 (1984); Saul Levmore, Bicameralism:
When are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 151-52 (1992).
23. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 233-42; Levmore, supra note 22, at 152-53.
24. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 236-42; Bruff, supra note 22, at 219; Levmore,
supra note 22, at 152-53. Buchanan and Tullock define "complete diversity" as a situation in which
"the members of the constituency of a representative in one house [are] distributed evenly among all
of the constituencies for the other house." BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 237 (italics
deleted).
Although bicameralism is today thought to play an important role in reducing the power of
factions, it is fascinating that Condorcet, a principal founder of social choice theory, was opposed to
it on the ground that it "had no theoretical justification." lain McLean & Arnold B. Urken, Did

Jefferson or Madison Understand Condorcet's Theory of Social Choice?, 73 PUB. CHOICE 445, 450
(1992). In his Lettres d'un bourgeois de New H[e]aven d un citoyen de Virginie, sur l'inutilitJde
partagerle pouvoir ligislatifen plusieurs corps (1787), Condorcet argued that "checks on tyrannical
legislatures and executives were better achieved by appropriate criteria for the franchise and a suitable voting rule involving qualified majorities." McLean & Urken, supra, at 450.
25. Assume that each entity to be represented is divided in half and that one member of Chamber A is elected by each half of the entity. Then assume that representatives to Chamber B are
elected from districts whose boundaries are drawn perpendicular (at a 90-degree angle) to the boundaries that determine representation in Chamber A. Under this most diverse possible arrangement of
bicameral geographical representation, 26% (51% of the representatives in each chamber, each of
whom is elected by 51% of her constituents) of the voters could be necessary for each chamber to
pass legislation. But approximately 13% of the voters could be geographically situated such that
their votes are necessary for passage in both houses. Thus approximately 39% of the voters (2 X
26% - 13%) could be necessary to secure passage of a law in this most diverse possible bicameral
legislature.
See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 241-42.
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bicameral legislature, a majority of the membership of one house can
block proposed legislation. Since each representative in the majority
need be elected by only a majority of the voters in her district, approximately 26 percent of the voters could, in theory, block legislation that
disadvantages a racial minority in a bicameral representative legislature.
In a plebiscite, however, a majority of the voters is always necessary to
block legislation.
The executive veto is likely to block enactments by a representative
body that would impose external costs on a majority. Although, as we
have seen, a coalition of as few as 26 percent of the voters may enact
legislation through a bicameral representative body, governors are
elected by (and presumed to be responsive to) no less than a simple majority of the voters. 26 Thus, the executive veto should impede the passage
in a bicameral legislature of only that subset of legislation that disadvantages a racial minority that would otherwise be enacted by a coalition of
27
26 to 50 percent of the voters.

If exercised, the gubernatorial veto requires that legislation pass
28
each house by a supermajority, typically two-thirds of the membership.
Where each citizen gets to vote for a representative in each (rather than
only one) chamber of a bicameral legislature, a two-thirds supermajority
override requirement could theoretically be met by approximately 45
29
percent of the voters, assuming the most diverse possible jurisdictions.
In contrast, a simple majority of voters is always necessary for a plebiscite to enact legislation (recall that no gubernatorial veto of plebiscitary
26. As Saul Levmore has noted, "[o]ne-quarter of the voters may elect one-half of the legislature, but the [executive] must still be responsive to a coalition of one-half." Levmore, supra note 22,
at 155.
This is particularly true in the case of governors who, unlike U.S. presidents, are elected directly
rather than by an electoral college.
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; Levmore, supra note 22, at 155.
28. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 1, at 172-74.

29. If the two chambers' representatives are elected from identical jurisdictions, only approximately 34% of the voters could in theory be required to achieve the two-thirds supermajority necessary to override a gubernatorial veto. That is, the same 66% of the representatives in each chamber
could vote in favor of the measure, and each representative in this supermajority need be elected by
only 51% of her constituents (.66 X .51 = .337).
If the two chambers' representatives are elected from the most diverse possible jurisdictions, see
supra note 25, a total of approximately 67% of the voters will be required to achieve a two-thirds
supermajority. Approximately 22% of those voters (44% of the voters in 51% of the jurisdictions),
however, will be geographically situated such that their votes are necessary for both chambers.
Thus, only approximately 45% of the voters (67% minus 22%) will be necessary to override a
gubernatorial veto if the two legislative chambers are elected from the most diverse possible jurisdictions.
Recall that in the absence of a gubernatorial veto, 26% (identical jurisdictions) to 39% (the
most diverse possible jurisdictions) of the voters is necessary to pass legislation in a bicameral legislature. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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legislation is available). Thus, even in the case of an executive veto, a
greater percentage of voters could, in theory, be required for a plebiscite
than for a bicameral representative legislature to pass legislation that disadvantages a racial minority.
The exercise of the executive veto also affects the minimum number
of voters necessary to block legislation. Under a two-thirds
supermajority rule, 34 percent of the representatives in one chamber
could, in theory, block a legislative override of an executive veto. Since
each representative need be elected by a mere majority of the voters, 17
percent of the voters could, in theory, block legislation in a bicameral
legislature once it has been vetoed by the executive. 30 In contrast, a majority of the voters is always necessary to block the enactment of plebiscitary legislation. Thus, in the case of an executive veto, a greater
percentage of voters could, in theory, be required for a plebiscite than for
a bicameral representative legislature to block the passage of legislation
that disadvantages a racial minority.
Because of the limited circumstances under which an exercise of the
executive veto is likely-theoretically when a bicameral legislature has
been captured by only 26 to 50 percent of the voters-we would expect
most legislation that disadvantages a racial minority to emerge from a
bicameral legislature without having to meet a two-thirds supermajority
override requirement. But the absence of an executive veto will also
mean that the disadvantageous legislation would likely be supported by
at least a majority of the voters. Thus, we would expect a majority of the
voters to be necessary in either a bicameral legislature or a plebiscite to
pass legislation that disadvantages a racial minority. Under these same
conditions and assumptions, however, fewer votes could, in theory, be
necessary for a bicameral legislature than for a plebiscite to block legislation that disadvantages a racial minority. Only 26 percent of the voters
could theoretically block legislation in even the most diverse possible bicameral legislature, 31 while a majority of the voters is always necessary to
block plebiscitary legislation.
Thus far, it would seem that a racial minority concerned about
blocking disadvantageous legislation is likely to prefer a bicameral legislature to a plebiscite. Although a majority of voters could, in theory, be
necessary in either process for a racist group to pass legislation that disadvantages a racial minority, a far smaller percentage of voters could, in
30. Recall that 26% of the voters could be necessary in the absence of a gubernatorial veto. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 25.
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theory, be necessary for a racial minority to block disadvantageous legislation in a bicameral legislature (26 percent) than in a plebiscite (51
percent).
Let us now relax some assumptions of Buchanan and Tullock's approach. Most critically, the number of voters actually necessary to block
legislation in a bicameral legislature may well be closer to 51 percent
than to the theoretical 26 percent. The figure of 26 percent assumes that
all representatives in the exactly 51 percent who vote against the proposed legislation are (1) elected by exactly 51 percent of voters, and (2)
that this group of constituents is identical with the exactly 51 percent of
their constituents who believe that the legislation at issue should not be
enacted. The figure of 26 percent also assumes that each of the remaining 49 percent of representatives in that chamber (1) is unanimously
elected by her constituents, and (2) that those constituents are further
unanimous in their agreement that the legislation at issue should be
passed.
Each of these foundational assumptions quite obviously represents
an extremely unlikely state of affairs. 32 We would expect, rather, that all
representatives are elected by-and will vote on any given issue to reflect
the preferences of-some percentage of their constituents between 51 and
99. As this more likely state of affairs is approximated, the number of
votes necessary to block legislation in a bicameral representative body
33
approaches 51 percent.
Relaxing some of Buchanan and Tullock's assumptions in this way
leads to the conclusion that very similar percentages of voters are likely
to be necessary for a plebiscite and for a representative body to block
legislation that disadvantages a racial minority. Thus, contrary to scholars' claims, bicameralism and the possibility of an executive veto should
not cause a representative body's enactments to be systematically less
likely than those of a plebiscite to disadvantage racial minorities. 34 In
32.

Even Buchanan and Tullock seem to appreciate this fact. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra

note 22, at 221.
33. Thus, for example, if each of the 51% of representatives in one chamber who vote against
the proposed legislation is elected by 70% of the voters, 90% of whom believe that the legislation at
issue should not be enacted, the number of voters actually necessary to block the legislation in a
bicameral legislature increases from 26% (.51 X .51 X 1.00) to 32% (.51 x .70 X .90). As each of
the first two component percentages increases, and as the third component percentage decreases, the
number of voters actually necessary to block legislation in a bicameral legislature approaches 51%
(1.00 x 1.00 X .51).
34. Both Bell and Eule, for example, contend that the bicameralism of legislatures makes representatives less likely than plebiscite voters to enact legislation that disadvantages racial minorities.
Bell argues that representatives' "excesses may be curtailed by the checks and balances of the political process," presumably including bicameralism. Bell, supra note 4, at 20. Eule claims more spe-
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addition, very similar percentages of voters are likely to be necessary for
a racial minority to enact rent-seeking or other advantageous legislation
through either legislative process. In sum, the bicameralism and the possibility of an executive veto in the representative lawmaking process do
not alone provide a priori reasons for a racial minority to prefer representative to direct democracy.
B.

Logrolling

The opportunity for logrolling is another apparent difference between representative and plebiscitary lawmaking processes. Logrolling
or vote trading means that individuals exchange one set of preferences for
another. 35 In particular, individuals with relatively less intense preferences on one issue provide their votes in exchange for others' votes on a
matter of greater personal importance. 36 Such trades arguably create
value, making all of the voters better off, and none worse off, than before
37
the exchange.
In order for logrolling to take place, three conditions must be met.
First, the same potential traders must be involved in multiple votes (or a
single vote on multiple issues). Second, the number of potential traders
must be relatively small, so that a given trade is likely to affect the outcome of the pertinent votes. Third, potential traders must be able to
monitor and sanction a trading partner's subsequent behavior (or the
pertinent votes must simultaneously, as in the case of a single vote on
38
multiple issues).
It is easy to see that all three conditions are readily met in a representative legislature, and quite difficult to satisfy in a plebiscite. Representatives hold office through a multitude of votes and, therefore,
possible trades. The number of representatives in a given legislature is
relatively small and constant. And the public nature of representatives'
cifically that bicameralism "imposes something like a supermajority voting rule," thereby forcing
majorities to seek broader coalitions. Eule, supra note 1, at 1557.
Both Bell and Eule also argue that the possibility of an executive veto makes representatives less
likely than plebiscite voters to enact legislation that disadvantages racial minorities. The veto is
another one of the "checks and balances of the political process" that Bell implicitly argues may
curtail representatives' "excesses," to the advantage of racial minorities. Bell, supra note 4, at 20.
Eule claims more specifically that the executive veto "not only affords minority groups an additional
ear on legislation that affects them, but because legislative override demands supermajority votes, the
veto also enhances minority currency." Eule, supra note 1, at 1557.
35. Gillette, supra note 4, at 967; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 122-23.
36. Gillette, supra note 4, at 967; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 122-23.
37. Gillette, supra note 4, at 967; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 122-23.
The issue of whether logrolling is a value-creating mechanism is a highly controversial one on
which much ink has been spilled. See infra note 49.
38. See Gillette, supra note 4, at 968.
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votes makes both monitoring and retaliation easy and relatively inexpensive. In addition, potential traders can solve the monitoring problem by
joining their issues in a single piece of legislation. Plebescite voters, in
contrast, do not often know what initiatives might appear on subsequent
ballots, and therefore cannot often make promises about future votes.
The relatively large number of plebiscite voters makes it highly unlikely
that any two individuals' trade will affect the outcomes of the pertinent
votes. And although individuals might agree to exchange votes, the privacy of the voting booth and anonymity of the votes make monitoring,
and therefore retaliation, nearly impossible even when the pertinent issues appear on the same ballot. Moreover, "single subject" requirements
may prevent potential traders from linking their issues in a single
39
initiative.
Although it would thus appear that legislatures provide more opportunities for logrolling than do plebiscites, Clayton Gillette has argued
that this difference is, at the very least, overstated. 40 He claims that logrolling "increases value because it gives those with the highest intensity
of preference control over an electoral outcome." '4 I Because representatives may be accused of shirking if they fail to cast any vote, logrolling
simply directs those who must vote in any event to do so "in a socially
optimal direction. ' 42 Plebiscites, Gillette contends, have "a similarly effective mechanism for reflecting relative intensity of preference. '43 One
explanation for why large numbers of individuals vote at all, given that
the expected personal costs of doing so typically will exceed the expected
personal benefits, 44 is that participating in the election produces its own
39. Several states require that each initiative be limited to a "single subject." See, e.g., ARIz.
CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 13; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3; Mo. CONST. art. III,
§ 50; MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 44-45. Although many of these states also subject legislative lawmaking to a single-subject requirement, the courts have not always held the two requirements to
embody the same legal standard. See, e.g., Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984); Lowenstein,
Single-Subject, supra note 4, at 936-38, 942-49.
In an important discussion of the purposes underlying the single-subject requirement, Daniel
Lowenstein observes that two major ones have been proposed: "limiting the diversity of an initiative
[in order] to avoid confusion by simplifying and clarifying the issues, and preventing logrolling that
could result in "subverting the will of the majority." Lowenstein, Single Subject, supra note 4, at 954
(citations omitted; emphasis added).
Whether either of these purposes is well served by the single-subject requirement is a matter on
which there is no clear consensus. See, e.g., id. at 954-68; A.B.A. SEC. TORTS & INS. PRAC., The
Challenge of Direct Democracy: Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Initiatives and
Referenda 40-47 (Discussion Draft June 1992) [hereinafter TIPS Task Force Report].
40. Gillette, supra note 4, at 968-69.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 946-47.
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benefits for these voters. 45 Under this "consumption benefits explanation
of voting," Gillette claims, "those who have little interest in the outcome
will simply not vote at all." '46 Thus, he concludes that issues put to a
plebiscite are unlikely to be decided by those without strong
preferences.

47

Although Gillette's argument provides support for the thesis of this
Article, it is important to recognize several problems with his analysis.
First, logrolling does not necessarily occur in a socially optimal direction,
as measured by an increase in aggregate societal welfare. Using the example set out in the following table, it is clear that Representatives A and
B can both increase their individual welfare (as measured in utils) by
trading votes on Issues 1 and 2.48 If both issues pass, Representatives A
and B will each realize a net utility of + 2, compared to a net utility of
-2 for each if no votes are traded and neither issue passes.
TABLE 1

Issue 1
Issue 2

Rep.A
+ 3 utiles
- 1 utiles

Rep. B
-I utiles
+ 3 utiles

Rep. C
- 4 utiles
- 8 utiles

Agg. util.
-2
-6

If Representatives A and B trade votes to secure the passage of both
issues, however, the aggregate social utility will be -8 (-2 and -6),
compared to an aggregate social utility of +8 (+2 and + 6) if neither
issue passes. Thus, contrary to Gillette's general claim, rationally selfinterested logrolling by Representatives A and B will not necessarily occur "in a socially optimal direction" or therefore increase societal wel' '49
fare. This is the classic "paradox of logrolling.
45. Id. at 951. "Voting, for example, permits the actor to view himself and to be viewed by
others as a participant in the political process. It allows one to share in the pleasures of a particular
victory or commiserate with others over a defeat." Id.
46. Id. at 969.
47. Id,
48. Neither Representative A nor B should be interested in entering into an agreement with C
if: (1) each individual's sincere preferences are known by the others, and (2) C cannot make side
payments.
49. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 49-58 (1979); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC CHOICE:

AN INTRODUCTION TO WELFARE ECONOMICS
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(1981); Peter Bernholz, Logrolling and the Paradoxof Voting: Are They Really Logically Equivalent?
A Comment, 69 AM. POL. Sa. REV. 961 (1975); David H. Koehler, Vote Trading and the Voting
Paradox: A Proofof Logical Equivalence, 69 AM. POL. SCi. REV. (1975) [hereinafter Koehler, Vote
Trading]; David H. Koehler, Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: Rejoinder, 69 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 967 (1975) [hereinafter Koehler, Rejoinder]; Joe Oppenheimer, Some PoliticalImplication of
"Vote Trading and the Voting Paradox: A Proofof Logical Equivalence. " A Comment, 69 AM. POL.
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Second, under the consumption benefits explanation of voting, contrary to Gillette's description, individuals may well vote in plebiscites
even if they have little interest in the outcome. Indeed, as Gillette himself earlier notes, participation under the consumption benefits explanation "becomes a worthwhile endeavor wholly apartfrom any benefits the
voter might receivefrom the particularresult of the political enterprise." ' 50
Individuals may vote, for example, simply because they want to view
themselves, and have others view them, as "a participant in the political
process." 5 '
Third, issues put to a plebiscite may frequently be decided by those
without strong preferences. Issues for plebiscitary decision typically appear on a ballot that includes candidates for elective office. 52 Thus, a
voter may decide to bear the transportation, opportunity, and other costs
of entering the booth because she is interested in the outcome of the election for a particular public office. 53 Once in the booth, however, the marginal cost to that voter of expressing a preference even on issues about
which she cares little is negligible. Thus, contrary to Gillette's claim,
individuals without strong preferences may well constitute a substantial-even decisive-proportion of the voters on any given plebiscite
54
issue.
Sci. REV. 963 (1975); William H. Riker & Steven J.Brains, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1235 (1973); Thomas Schwartz, Vote Trading andPareto Efficiency, 24 PUB. CHOICE
101 (1975).
50. Gillette, supra note 4, at 951.
51. Id. at 951.
For an interesting exchange on why people vote, compare Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee,
Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 993, 997-99 (1988) (voting is costless way of expressing individual's ideology), with Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee,
66 TEX. L. REV. 1013, 1016-18 (1988) ("ideology, not self-interest, motivates voting") [hereinafter
Farber & Frickey, Reply). See also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 893-94 (1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence];
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 24-27, 37 ("People apparently vote because of some view of
political obligation: it is part of their conception of themselves as citizens in a democracy.").
52. MAGLEBY, supra note 1,at 88-89 ("[s]pecial elections" held solely for initiatives are "rare
in the United States but somewhat more common in Europe").
53. Similarly, if more than one plebiscitary issue is to be decided on a given ballot, a voter may
decide to bear the costs of entering the booth because she is interested in the outcome of one particular issue. Once in the booth, however, the marginal cost to the voter of expressing a preference on
the other issues (about which she may care little) is negligible.
54. The proportion of voters on any given initiative who have strong preferences regarding the
outcome is likely to be a function of: (1) the type of election (special or general), and (2) the subject
matter of the initiative.
Voter turnout in special elections (held solely for initiatives) is typically much lower than in
general elections. See MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 87-89. Indeed, even when voter "dropoff" in
general elections is taken into account, see id. at 83-95, voter "turnout" is typically higher for propositions that appear on general, rather than special, election ballots. One might therefore infer that
a higher proportion of initiative voters in general elections than in special elections do not have a
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Finally, to the extent that those with the greatest intensity of preference may be able to use logrolling under certain circumstances to control
legislative outcomes, 55 it seems clear that logrolling in a representative
body achieves this far better than Gillette's plebiscitary equivalent.
Under Gillette's own assumption, those whose interest in the outcome of
a given plebiscite is below a certain low point are unlikely to vote. 56 All
those whose interest in the outcome is above that point are likely to vote,
but the plebescite will aggregate their preferences without regard to their
intensity. Logrolling in the legislature, in contrast, allows many more
gradations of intensity of preference to be registered, and therefore provides greater (if still imperfect) assurance that those with the highest aggregate intensity of preference will control the outcome of any given
vote.
Given the various difficulties with Gillette's analysis, I cannot agree
that "the superiority of legislative compromise" is overstated. 57 And I
remain of the view-unfavorable to the thesis of this Article-that legislatures provide more opportunities for logrolling than do plebiscites.
But what are the implications of the legislature's greater logrolling
opportunities for a minority group's ability to block disadvantageous legislation? First, it should be noted that the legislature's greater number of
logrolling opportunities will not necessarily mean that a racial minority
will be better able to block the passage of disadvantageous legislation in a
representative body than in a plebiscite. When voters are able to state
their "sincere" preferences concerning one issue taken in isolation from
another, 58 Robert Sugden, for example, contends that "log-rolling prostrong preference regarding the success of the proposition, and are voting because the cost of doing
so is negligible once one is in the booth.
Voter "dropoff" on general election ballots is not typically a function of ballot location (voter
"fatigue") in the case of initiatives. Id. at 90-95. Rather, "[s]ome voters appear to pick and choose
the propositions on which they will vote, with popular initiatives eliciting the largest amount of
participation." Id. at 90. Thus, for example, in California's 1976 general election, 350,000 more
voters marked their ballots for Proposition 13 (the Jarvis-Gann property tax initiative) than for
governor, even though Proposition 13 came at the end of the ballot and the governor's race was the
first ballot choice. Id. at 91-92. In sum, the subject matter of a ballot proposition is a powerful
predictor of both voter "turnout" on that proposition and the proportion of voters who have a strong
preference regarding the proposition's enactment.
55. The most critical of these circumstances are: (1)the number of issues to be decided and,
therefore, the number of votes any one representative has available for trading, and (2) whether sidepayments in a currency other than votes are possible and permitted. See also infra note 73.
56. Gillette, supra note 4, at 968-69. This does not mean, however, that they will not affect the
outcome; the absence of their vote may well do so.
57. Gillette, supra note 4, at 968.
58. SUGDEN, supra note 49, at 183. Sugden gives the following example of a voter who is
incapable of stating his "sincere" preferences concerning one issue taken in isolation from another:
[Tlhere are two issues: whether there should be a pub in village A, and whether there
should be a pub in village B .... [One person] most prefers that neither village has a pub,
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vides no defence for minorities against the injustices of the principle of
majority rule."'59 Although Sugden's own analysis does not support so
absolute a conclusion, 60 it is clear that the results of logrolling are not
likely to differ from the results of sincere voting under many
61
conditions.
If a Condorcet choice exists-that is, if a single alternative defeats
all competitors in head-to-head competition even though it is not the first
choice of a majority 62-it will ultimately be chosen if everyone votes sincerely. A logrolling process, however, will also converge on a Condorcet
choice because it is the only outcome that cannot be blocked by any coalition of voters. 63 Thus, if a Condorcet choice exists, the logrolling probut thinks that it is better to have pubs in both villages than to have a pub in only one.
(Perhaps he is particularly concerned about the danger of people driving while drunk; if
there must be pubs at all, it is better to locate them so that people do not have to travel far
to get to them.) This person's preferences concerning one issue depend on how the other
issue is decided. If it is decided that there is to be no pub in village B, then he would prefer
there to be no pub in A either. But if it is decided to have a pub in B, then he would prefer
there to be a pub in A also. . . . It is of course possible for him to vote, that is, to record
some ordering of the relevant issue outcomes; but there is no real meaning to the idea of his
voting sincerely.
Id.
59. Id. at 184.
60. It should be noted that although Sugden's claim is absolute, the reasoning he provides in
support leads to a less absolute conclusion. He does not demonstrate that logrolling "provides no
defence for minorities against the injustices of the principle of majority rule," id., but rather that
logrolling will not always, and perhaps may never, provide such defense for a given minority. Moreover, nothing in Sugden's analysis disproves the intuition that a minority is more likely to be able to
block disadvantageous legislation in a lawmaking process that provides more rather than fewer (or
no) opportunities for logrolling.
61. See, e.g., SUGDEN, supra note 49, at 185. On this claim, see also Bernholz, supra note 49;
Koehler, Vote Trading, supra note 49; Koehler, Rejoinder, supra note 49; Oppenheimer, supra note
49.
62. In the following example, alternative 1 is the Condorcet winner since both A and B prefer I
to 3, and both A and C prefer 1 to 2:
A
1
2
3

B
2
1
3

C
3
1
2

The notion of a Condorcet choice derives from MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, ESSAI SUR
L'APPLICATION DE L'ANALYSE A LA PROBABILITf Dfs DECISIONS RENDUES A LA PLURALITt D-S
Voix. See also MUELLER, supra note 49, at 61-64; HANNU NURMI, COMPARING VOTING SYSTEMS
66-80 (1987); SUGDEN, supra note 49, at 140, 147; Saul Levmore, ParliamentaryLaw, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 989 n.55, 994-96 (1989).
63. SUGDEN, supra note 49, at 148. Sugden notes that a Condorcet choice is the only "core
solution" to the logrolling game:
An outcome is said to be in the core of a game if it cannot be blocked by any coalition of
players. Given the assumption that all preferences take the form of strict orderings, a
coalition of players blocks one outcome, x, if there is some other alternative, y, such that (i)
every member of the coalition prefers y to x, and (ii) by the rules of the game, concerted
action by the members of the coalition can ensure that y is the outcome of the game,
irrespective of what non-members do.... [A]n alternative, x, is in the core of the majority
rule game if and only if, for every other feasible alternative, y, a majority of voters prefer x
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cess will converge on the same outcome that would result from sincere
voting on the issues.64
If a Condorcet choice does not exist, the outcome of sincere voting
will be a function of such "procedural" variables as the order in which
various alternatives are formally considered. 65 Similarly, the process of
logrolling will not converge at all. 66 Of course, the process of coalitionforming and bargaining may end if, for example, there is a rule that voting must take place at a given time. But one cannot predict ex ante
which alternative will then be chosen. 67 Thus, the outcome of the logrolling process is likely sometimes to be-but is unlikely always to be68
the same as the result of sincere voting.
This means that a racial minority will not be able to block the passage of disadvantageous legislation through logrolling if that legislation is
a Condorcet choice of a majority (or of a super-majority, in the case of an
executive veto) of the legislature. When the proposed legislation is not a
Condorcet choice of a majority of the legislature, however, it is difficult
to predict the outcome of a logrolling process or of sincere voting. It
to y. This of course is Condorcet's criterion. The core of the game is identical with the
Condorcet choice.
Id.
64. SUGDEN, supra note 49, at 185.
65. This is the "voting paradox," frequently referred to as the Arrow "impossibility theorem,"
see KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951), although the theoretical significance of the paradox was discussed by Black in the 1940s, see DUNCAN BLACK, THE
THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958). See also SUGDEN, supra note 49, at 140;
Levmore, supra note 62, at 984-90; Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLuM. L. REV.
2121 (1990) and sources cited therein.
Arrow's theorem applies equally to both direct and representative democracy. Herbert
Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 89 (1990) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Legislation]. Scholars increasingly agree, however, "that the conditions for Arrow's
theorem must be strictly specified, and that the conditions are not necessarily satisfied in actual
[democratic decisionmaking] bodies." Id. at 90. See also Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra
note 5 1, at 901-06 (surveying literature); Pildes & Anderson, supra at 2127 (concluding that once the
"peculiar conceptions of rationality and of democratic politics" underlying social choice theory are
exposed, the theory "pose[s] no significant challenge to the general legitimacy and meaningfulness of
democratic decision making"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992) (critique of popular argument that "political markets cannot be
shown to produce efficient outcomes the way that private economic markets can"); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949
(1990) (arguing that Arrow's condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives generally fails to
obtain the legislative process).
Although the literature discussing the applicability of Arrow's theorem to actual democratic
decisionmaking processes has focused on representative lawmaking bodies, analogous arguments can
be readily made in the context of direct lawmaking processes.
66. SUGDEN, supra note 49, at 185.
67. Id.
68. "[O]ne cannot rule out the possibility that the chosen outcome [of the logrolling process]
will be the same as the one that would have resulted from sincere voting." Id.
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will, therefore, be difficult to predict whether logrolling will result in a
different outcome than sincere voting. Thus, a racial minority is unlikely
always to be, but is likely sometimes to be, able to use logrolling successfully to block disadvantageous legislation. 69 This conclusion is not inconsistent with the intuition that a racial minority is more likely to be
able to block disadvantageous legislation in a lawmaking process that
provides more rather than fewer (or no) opportunities for logrolling.
Three important constraints, however, substantially reduce-even if
they do not eliminate-the usefulness of logrolling for improving a racial
minority's ability to block disadvantageous legislation. First, logrolling
can alter the results of a vote only if the minority feels more intensely
about an issue than the majority. 70 That is, if the majority is equally or
more intense in its sincere preference, the majority's preference will prevail no matter what logrolling opportunities are available to the minority. 71

As has already been discussed with regard to Table 1 above,

however, even a minority that is more intense in its sincere preference
than a majority may not be able to use logrolling to achieve its preferred
outcome under some circumstances. 72 A minority group will be able to
use logrolling to achieve a favorable result "only when the intensity of
preferences of the minority is sufficiently greater than that of the majority
to make the minority willing to sacrifice enough votes on other issues to
'73
detach marginal voters from the majority.
69. Sugden's explicit conclusion is stronger but, as explained supra note 60, unjustifiably so. He
concludes that "there is little reason to expect log-rolling to produce results any different from those
produced by sincere voting." Id.
70. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 133.

71. Id.
72. See supra note 55 and text accompanying notes 48-49.
73. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 133 (emphasis added). Compare Table I supra
with the following table:
Rep. A

Rep. B

Rep. C

Agg. Util.

Issue 1

+3

utils

- 1 util

-4

utils

-2

Issue 2

-1 util

+3 utils

-8

utils

-6

utils
utils

Issue 3

+ 1 util

--2 utils

-3 utils

-4

utils

If Representative C trades Representative A its votes on Issues I and 3 in order to keep Representative B from trading its vote on Issue 2 to Representative B (in exchange for the latter's vote on
Issue 1), the result will be that Issues I and 3 pass, but Issue 2 does not. Representative A will net
+ 3 utils, Representative C will net + I util, and Representative B will net -6 utils.
If Representative A instead trades its vote on Issue 2 for Representative B's vote on Issue I
(Representative B will not profit from trading its votes on Issues I and 3 for Representative A's vote

on Issue 2), Issues 1 and 2 would pass, but Issue 3 would not. Representative A would net + 1 util,
compared to the + 3 utils it nets if it trades instead with Representative C.
Note that the key issue remains the possibility of side payments to balance out the lost utilsthat is, even on the conditions set out in Table 1, Representative C achieves a net gain of + I util if
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Second, prejudice can severely (and irrationally) constrain the logrolling opportunities available to certain interest group representatives
within a legislature. 74 Substantial empirical evidence supports the proposition that "[a] discrete and insular electoral minority often remains an
outvoted legislative minority."' 75 Or, in other words, "prejudice may
simply transfer the 'gerrymandering' problem from the electorate to the
legislature."' 76 In order for minority group representatives 77 to form a
winning coalition, majority group representatives must enter into crossracial alliances. 78 Majority group members are less likely to do so the
more they outnumber the minority group, and the more racially charged
the atmosphere. 79 Majority group representatives may also be less likely
to join with minority group representatives on issues of particular or
he can make side payments totaling 7 utils to Representatives A and B in some currency other than
votes, in order to ensure that Issue 2 does not pass.
74. Many legal scholars have discussed the effect of racial prejudice on the effectiveness of
racial minorities in the legislature. No consensus has yet emerged. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams,
"Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participationand Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 500-03 (1988); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 732-35 (1985); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1114-28 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier,
Tokenism]; Lani Guinier, No Two Seats. The Elusive Quest for PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, Seats]; Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the PoliticalProcess: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1868-72, 1880,
1887-88 (1992); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 216-18 (1989); Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1523-24, 1530-32 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50-55 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Forward];Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymanderingand
Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM L. REV. 1325, 1367-72 (1987).
Scholars have similarly disputed the issue of whether a racial minority is most effectively represented by a member of the minority group or a sympathetic member of the majority group. See, e.g.,
ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 7, 21 (1987); Abrams, supra;Guinier, Tokenism, supra, at 1102-34; Lani Guinier, Keep-

ing the Faith:Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 420-29 (1989)
[hereinafter Guinier, Faith]; Issacharoff, supra, at 1880; Karlan, supra; Schuck, supra.
For purposes of the current discussion, I will assume that members of a racial minority are most
effectively represented by a member of that minority. By "minority group representatives," therefore, I mean a member of the racial minority whose constituents are also largely members of that
minority.
75. Guinier, Seats, supra note 74, at 1416; see also Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 74, at 111628, and sources cited therein. Lani Guinier has further suggested that "litigation to ensure descriptive representation predictably transfers the problem of disenfranchisement from the electorate to
the legislature." Guinier, Seats, supra note 74, at 1416.
76. Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 74, at 1126 (footnote omitted). Guinier further notes that a
vast array of cases have involved unsuccessful challenges to various types of legislative or deliberative gerrymander "in which minority representatives [are] denied the political clout they would enjoy but for racial prejudice," often as a result of "majoritarian group voting rules that
disproportionately marginalize their status as a permanent, racially homogeneous legislative minority." Guinier, Seats, supra note 74, at 1436.
77. See supra note 74 for my definition of "minority group representative."
78. Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 74, at 1123-24.
79. Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 74, at 1116, 1123-24, and sources cited therein.
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unique concern to the racial minority.80 Minority group representatives'
frequently resulting status as "an ineffective, 'seen but not heard' minority in the legislature" means that they will often be able to provide only
"descriptive" rather than "functional" representation of distinctive mi81
nority group interests.
Third, even in the absence of any prejudice, minority group representatives within a legislature may find their logrolling opportunities to
be severely constrained. Depending on the number and size of competing coalitions, the minority group representatives may actually be numerically incapable of affecting the outcome no matter how they vote.8 2
They will therefore lack the bargaining power necessary for successful
coalition-building and logrolling. In formal, game-theoretic terms, these
minority group representatives will have a Shapley-Shubik index of
zero.83 None of the competing coalitions will therefore experience any
increase in its own Shapley-Shubik index if it joins with the minority
group representatives. 84
Although the above three constraints substantially reduce the likelihood that a minority group will be able to use logrolling successfully to
80. Id. at 1123, 1126-27; FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWER-

MENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 135-36 (1990); THERNSTROM, supra note 74, at 7.
81. Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 74, at 1116; Guinier, Seats, supra note 74, at 1416 & n.4,
1457, 1459-61.
82. See, e.g., MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND

SOLUTIONS 200-206 (1982).
83. Id. The probability model for the Shapley-Shubik index considers all possible orders in
which a vote can take place. For any ordering of the players there will be a unique player who is in a
position to provide the coalition with just enough strength to win. That player is the pivot for the
coalition. If all n! orderings are assumed equiprobable, then the Shapley-Shubik index is a measure
of the probability that any player is pivotal.
In the following example, the game has four players (or coalitions)-A, B, C, 1-with votes of
2, 2, 2, and 1, respectively. Four votes are needed to carry a motion. The game is denoted (4: 2, 2, 2,
1), where 4 is the quota and the votes are the weights of the players (size of the coalitions). In each
of the 24 (4!) possible orderings of the four players (coalitions), the pivot is underlined.
ABC1
AB1C
A1BC
A1CB
ACB1
ACIB

BAC1
BA1C
CABl
CA1B
IABC
1ACB

BCAI
B1AC
CBA1
C1AB
ICAB
1BAC

BC1A
BICA
CB1A
CIBA
IBCA
1CBA

The Shapley-Shubik indices for A, B, C, and 1 are, respectively, 8/24, 8/24, 8/24, and 0/24.
Thus, minority group representatives could constitute 1/7 of the legislative body (that is, have the
voting strength of player I in the above example), but be numerically incapable of affecting the
outcome of any motion no matter how they vote, even if they vote as a block.
I am grateful to Peter Swire for introducing me to the wonders of the Shapley-Shubik index.
84. This can be seen by comparing the results when the game = (4: 2, 2, 2, 1) with the results
when the game = (3: 3, 2, 2). In both games, the Shapley-Shubik index for two- and three-person
coalitions is 8/24, implying that a two-person coalition does not experience any increase in its
Shapley-Shubik index by adding an additional member.
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block disadvantageous legislation, they do not reduce that likelihood to
zero. Nor do these constraints alter the fact that a representative lawmaking process is likely to provide more opportunities for logrolling than
will a plebiscitary process. A greater number of logrolling opportunities,
however, need not result in a lower likelihood that legislation that disadvantages a racial minority is enacted, ceteris paribus. Critically, a greater
number of logrolling opportunities does not dictate the direction in which
logs are actually rolled. The greater number of logrolling opportunities
is possessed by all interest groups' representatives. And one interest
group's preference that a piece of legislation be enacted or blocked can be
at least as intense as another group's opposing preference.
American history does not lack for examples either of legislation
that disadvantages a racial minority being enacted, or of legislation that
advantages a racial minority being blocked, because a racist minority
group was able to trade votes and form a coalition with a racially indifferent group.8 5 There are also corollary examples of relatively stable majority racist coalitions, each comprised of two or more potential factions,
which are able to hold together only by trading votes on nonracial issues.
William Riker, for example, wrote in 1962 that "most Southern politicians" subscribe to the unwritten rule that "no faction may be allowed to
be a quasi-permanent loser if there is any likelihood that it will attempt
86
to escape this position by bringing Negroes into the political system."
He adds that this "has in practice meant that no issue may be raised that
is so divisive in the white society that two permanent factions may be
built around it," and thus explains the absence of dual factionalism
"most of the time since the 1890s" in the Democratic party in states
without significant Republican minorities. 8 7 Riker notes that this un85. Most notably, "the post-Reconstruction disenfranchisement of blacks seems to have been
motivated largely by the fear that the populist movement would ultimately produce a coalition of
blacks and lower-class whites." Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673,
705 n.100 (1992) (citing V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 8, 541 (1949);
J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 18, 36-37, 147-48, 203, 221 (1974);
STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969,
HENRY L. MOON, BALANCE OF POWER: THE NEGRO VOTE 72-73 (1948)).

at 9-10 (1976);

Seidman adds that "[t]he pervasive system of segregation together with the elaborate racist
ideology supporting it maintained the taboo against interracial political coalitions." Seidman, supra,
at 706.
It is a difficult empirical question whether racial minorities have been more often helped or hurt
throughout American history by the greater opportunities for logrolling in representative bodies.
86. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 179 (1962).
87. Id. at 178-79. According to Riker's analysis, one would normally expect factions to arise in
this context because the "size principle" should lead to a minimization in the size of the winning
coalition in the Democratic party within a given state in order to maximize each coalition member's
gains from victory. Id. at 32-101.
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written rule was occasionally evaded and a two-faction system in the
game for the control of government created, but only after the "seceding" group identified itself "as the most virulent of Negro-haters," thus
providing assurance that "the creation of a two-faction system [would]
not, from their side at least, involve the re-entry of Negroes into South'88
ern politics."
89
C. Agenda Control

An important, if frequently overlooked, 90 difference between representative and direct lawmaking is the control of the agenda in the two
processes. The plebiscitary agenda, William Riker notes, "is set, almost
always and almost entirely, by the author of the initiative." 9 1 In a representative body, in contrast, "the agenda is set by a combination of the
legislature's majority party (or a committee of it), back benchers who in
one way or another insert themselves in the agenda-setting process, and
the pre-existing legislative rules."'92 As Riker has formally demonstrated,
this difference in agenda control results in a greater likelihood that the
status quo wins in a representative body than in a plebiscite, ceteris
paribus.9 3 Riker concludes from this finding that "minorities have a better chance under a representative system."'94
I take issue only with Riker's ultimate conclusion. It seems clear
that the lawmaking process that is more likely to favor the status quo is
not necessarily the one that a racial minority will in general prefer.
Sometimes, as in Riker's Figure 3,95 the racial minority may prefer the
status quo (continued busing) to other alternatives (the elimination of
busing, or continued busing but only for a new set of magnet schools). In
88. Id. at 179-80.
89. This section did not exist in the Conference draft of this paper, on which the published
comments of Professors Eule and Riker were based. In this section, I reply to some issues raised in
their published comments, particularly those of Professor Riker. Due to the length of my discussion
of these issues, it seemed preferable to take them up in the text of my final version rather than in
extensive footnotes.
90. Indeed, I failed to discuss this difference in the Conference draft of this paper. See supra
note 89. This difference has been similarly overlooked by the other legal scholars who have undertaken a comparative examination of the two lawmaking processes. See Allen, supra note 3; Bell,
supra note 4; Gillette, supra note 4. Eule notes only that "limited access to the ballot may provide
greater opportunities for agenda manipulation by initiative sponsors, enabling them to achieve equilibria not reflective of majority tastes." Eule, supra note 1, at 1521.
91. William H. Riker, Comment on Baker, "DirectDemocracy and Discrimination: A Public
Choice Perspective," 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 791 (1991).
92. Id.
93. "[T]he parliamentary procedure [of the representative body] ... reserves the most advantageous position for the status quo, while the plebiscitary procedure allows the first pressure group to
take the opportunity to get a substantial advantage over latecomers and the status quo." Id. at 793.
94. Id. at 794.
95. Id.
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these cases, Riker is correct that the racial minority will prefer representative to direct lawmaking. On other occasions, however, the racial minority may like the status quo (continued employment discrimination)
much less than the proposed alternatives (the elimination of employment
discrimination, or continued employment discrimination but only against
short Blacks). In these instances, the racial minority will prefer direct to
representative democracy, because of the greater likelihood that the status quo will not be the winner under the former lawmaking process.
In sum, the difference in agenda control in the two lawmaking
processes will, under Riker's analysis, result in legislation that disadvantages a racial minority and legislation that advantages it both being less
likely to be enacted through representative than direct democracy, ceteris
paribus. A racial minority thus has an a priori reason to be relatively
more optimistic that disadvantageous legislation will be blocked in a representative body, but relatively more optimistic that advantageous legislation will be enacted in a plebiscite. Which lawmaking process the
racial minority ought in general to prefer, however, will depend on (1) its
assessment of the status quo (does it largely advantage or disadvantage
the minority?); (2) whether its preference that disadvantageous legislation be defeated is, at the median, more intense than its preference that
advantageous legislation be enacted; and (3) whether advantageous or
disadvantageous legislation is more often proposed.
D. Open Voting
The representative and plebiscitary lawmaking processes are further
distinguishable by the open voting of decisionmakers in the former and
anonymous voting in the latter. The intuition of most commentators has
been that a racial minority should clearly prefer the open voting of the
representative legislature to the anonymous voting of the plebiscite,
ceterisparibus. Politicians, it is asserted, "are in the spotlight and do not
wish publicly to advocate racism. ' '96 In addition, "[w]hen minorities are
part of the legislative 'we,' subordination of the 'other' becomes both
96. Bell, supra note 4, at 13-14. Bell argues that the anonymity of the direct democracy vote,
contrasted with the openness of the representative vote, makes the former a more effective facilitator
of bias, discrimination, and prejudice. Id. at 13-15. He claims that "few of the concerns that can
transform the 'conservative' politician into a 'moderate' public official are likely to affect the individual [plebiscite] voter's decision." Id. at 14. He adds that "[n]o political factors counsel restraint on
racial passions emanating from longheld and little considered beliefs and fears." Id.
Bell cites as an interesting historical example the Oregon territory's 1857 referendum to exclude
all free blacks.
Despite its very small black population, residents of the territory had discussed barring
blacks for several years, but neither the legislature nor constitutional conventions would
approve such a measure because each political party feared that another would be able to
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more visible and less comfortable. ' 97 Close examination reveals the issue
to be much more complicated and any conclusion less clear, however.
It is a commonplace of modem American politics that pre-election
and exit polls systematically overstate the proportion of the vote that the
black candidate in a racially mixed race will actually receive. 98 A popular and plausible interpretation of this persistent finding is that (typically
white) individuals are more willing to vote against the black candidate
than to admit publicly that they will or did; that is, individuals are more
often willing to be "racists" than to risk being perceived as such. 99
One must be careful, however, when extrapolating from these findings to the present context. To the extent these data suggest that plebiscites would yield different results if the voting were open rather than
exploit the issue. When the proposal was finally submitted to a popular vote, however, it
received more support than an accompanying antislavery proposition.
Id. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
It is important to note, however,-and Bell does-that several state legislatures had also enacted "similar provisions" as a result of "strong pressure from their constituencies." Id. at 17 n.65.
97. Eule, supra note 1, at 1555.
98. See, e.g., Robert Staples, Tom Bradley's Defeat: The Impact ofRacial Symbols on Political
Campaigns, 13 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 37, 43 (Fall 1982) (pre-election pollsters "figured in a 4-5
percent racial bias factor" in their Bradley-Deukmejian predictions); Dan Balz, Vote Counting Methods, Race Factor in Polls Leave Plenty of Room for Error; Some Blame Voters for Off-the-Mark
Projections,WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1989, at A37 (Wilder and Dinkins elections "highlighted the complexities of conducting polls pitting a black candidate against a white candidate"); Les Payne, The
Lies White Voters Tell to Pollsters, NEWSDAY, Nov. 12, 1989, at 11 ("[w]henever polls show a black
candidate ahead of a big-city white opponent, one has to shave 10 points from the leader's margin to
get the accurate tally.").
99. What surprises about the polls is not that some white respondents lied, before and
after, about their having voted for a black candidate, but that anyone would expect otherwise. The pattern holds in racial polling in other areas. As segregated housing, for instance, became less acceptable in principle, pollsters have recorded Americans' attitudes as
becoming more tolerant of black neighbors.
However, there has not been a corresponding decrease in segregated housing, in fact.
Blacks today encounter perhaps as much racism in house-hunting as they did in the days
when pollsters registered less racial tolerance among white respondents. As with the political polling... , some people prefer to give the socially acceptable answer so long as it is
not binding.
Payne, supra note 98, at 11.
Lying by white respondents is not the only plausible explanation for the inaccuracy of preelection and exit polls in contests between a black and a white candidate. An unusually high number
of those who favor the white candidate may refuse to participate in the survey or may claim to be
undecided. See Staples, supra note 98, at 44; Balz, supra note 98, at A37; see also Larry Tye, In
South, Ballot Box Inequality Lingers On, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 1990, at 1 ("Polls by The Atlantic
Constitution found that a third of whites would be reluctant to vote for a black. Other surveys
suggest the number is even higher, but whites are reluctant to acknowledge their racism in interviews.").
The race of the interviewer may further skew the results if white voters are unusually reluctant
to tell a black interviewer that they do not support the black candidate. See Balz, supra note 98, at
A37. Finally, the inaccuracy of pre-election (but not exit) polls may be explained by changes in the
race, with the white candidate in fact picking up support after the final pre-election polls have been
conducted. See id.
It is, of course, the case that a vote in favor of the white candidate running against a black is not
necessarily a "racist" vote.
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anonymous, the difference in outcomes is likely to be greatest when the
proposed legislation explicitly and unambiguously discriminates against
a racial minority in its intent and effect. One is more likely to be perceived as "racist" if one supports (and is therefore more likely to be deterred by open voting from supporting) legislation that is obviously and
intentionally intended to disadvantage a racial minority, than if one votes
in favor of legislation that is ambiguous in both its effect and intent. The
courts, however, should have little difficulty finding such obviously and
intentionally disadvantaging legislation unconstitutional. Legislation
about whose purpose and effects reasonable people disagree is more likely
to be sustained by the courts, and open voting is less likely to deter support of such legislation.
Moreover, the present issue is not whether plebiscites with open voting would yield different results than plebiscites with anonymous voting,
but whether anonymous-voting plebiscites are systematically more likely
than open-voting representative bodies to enact legislation that disadvantages racial minorities. Two issues merit discussion. First, a personally
nonracist representative has incentives to support legislation that disadvantages a racial minority that she would not have if her vote were anonymous-incentives that the nonracist anonymous plebiscite voter does
not have. Most obviously, to the extent that a nonracist representative
seeks reelection and has a majority of constituents who support proposed
legislation that disadvantages a racial minority (or who simply prefer a
racist representative), the personally nonracist representative has an incentive to support the disadvantageous legislation that he would not have
if his vote were anonymous. The anonymous plebiscite voter never has
such an incentive.
On the other hand, to the extent that a personally racist representative seeks reelection and has a majority of constituents who oppose proposed legislation that disadvantages a racial minority (or who simply
prefer a nonracist representative), the racist representative has an incentive to oppose the disadvantageous legislation that he would not have if
his vote were anonymous. Again, the anonymous plebiscite voter never
has such an incentive. Which of these two states of affairs more often
occurs, however, is difficult to assess.
Second, the median voter may be more willing to vote (anonymously) for representatives who openly support legislation that disadvantages a racial minority, than she would be to vote anonymously for the
same legislation in a plebiscite. The voter may simply be less comfortable enacting discriminatory legislation directly than indirectly. In addition, the voter will likely be able to justify (to herself and others) her
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choice of a "racist" representative on the basis of his many policies and
actions on non-racial issues;1°° explaining her plebiscite vote in non-racial terms is likely to be more difficult.
Finally, to the extent that open voting deters representatives from
supporting legislation that disadvantages a racial minority, it is most
likely to do so in the case of legislation that is explicitly and unambiguously discriminatory in its intent and effect. And, as has already been
noted, the courts should have little difficulty finding such legislation unconstitutional. More problematic is legislation about whose purpose and
effects reasonable people disagree. Although open voting may also deter
representatives from supporting legislation of this latter sort, it seems at
least as likely that open voting will instead cause representatives to engage in sophisticated subterfuge, obfuscation, and rationalization when
drafting such legislation and crafting its official history.101 (Indeed, the
seeming ambiguity of such legislation may itself be the product of crafty
obfuscation.) Unlike the typical plebiscite voter, representatives are, after all, lawmaking experts. 102
E. Deliberation and Naked Preferences
Finally, several commentators have contended that representative
legislatures are likely to engage in more deliberation than plebiscites on
I

100. For example, supporters of former Klan grand wizard, David Duke, in the 1991 Louisiana
gubernatorial election gave a wide range of non-racial reasons for their decision: a dislike of his
opponent, Peter Applebome, On Eve of Louisiana Vote, Nothing Is Certain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1991, at Al [hereinafter Applebome, On Eve]; "just want[ing] a change," Applebome On Eve, supra,
at Al; Peter Applebome, Louisiana PoliticsDances to Music of Rage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1991, at
I [hereinafter Applebome, Louisiana]; the economy, Applebome, Louisiana, supra, at 1; Peter Applebome, Duke May Seem to Be Wallace of '91, But Both Times and the Risks Differ, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 1991, at A14 [hereinafter Applebome, Duke]; the environment, Applebome, Louisiana,
supra, at 1; taxes, Applebome, On Eve, supra, at Al; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home.: "America Be
on Guard," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at A15; William Schneider, Riding the Anti-Establishment
Wave, 16 NAT'L J. 2894 (Nov. 23 1991); welfare, Lewis, supra, at A15; Applebome, Duke, supra, at
A14; Schneider, supra, at 2894; big government, id.; to send an anti-establishment message, id.; to
"shake things up," id.; crime, Applebome, Duke, supra, at A14.
Not surprisingly, only 12 percent of Duke voters told exit pollsters that his views on racial
matters decided their vote. Schneider, supra, at 2894. Indeed, "[m]ore than 80 percent of Duke's
supporters said they thought he had changed his views on race since the days when he was a leader
of the Ku Klux Klan." Id.
101. It is important to note that state enactments, unlike federal ones, often have no or little
published legislative history. Harry Willmer Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the FederalCourts, 25 IOWA L.
REV. 737, 738 (1940); Note, NonlegislativeIntent as an Aide to Statutory Interpretation,49 COLUM.
L. REV. 676, 677 (1949); McNellie, Note, Extrinsic Aids, supra note 4, at 164.
102. For an interesting analysis of the various incentives affecting the degree of subterfuge legislators employ in drafting bills, see Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). See also
infra note 121.
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any given issue. 103 As a result, they argue, legislation enacted by a representative body is less likely to violate minority rights and more likely to
realize "the common good" than is legislation enacted through direct
democracy.10 4 Close examination of this premise and conclusion, however, finds both to be seriously flawed.
In this section, I first use a conception of deliberation popular
among civic republican theorists to compare representative bodies and
plebiscites. I find that one cannot conclude a priori that the decisions of
individual representatives will more often than those of plebiscite voters
(1) be motivated by a concern with "the public good," or (2) be explicitly
justified by appeals to the public good. Nor can one conclude a priori
that the decisions of legislatures will more often than those of plebiscites
reflect consensus-building through conversation rather than the mere aggregation of bargained-over preferences.
103. Derrick Bell, for example, charges that the ordinary voter is likely to be less well informed,
less responsible, and more emotional, than the typical representative. He notes that "intense interest" in direct democracy is generated "when the issues are seemingly clear-cut and often emotional
matters such as liquor, gun control, pollution, pornography, or race." Bell, supra note 4, at 18. He
adds that "[t]he emotionally charged atmosphere often surrounding referenda and initiatives can
easily reduce the care with which the voters consider the matters submitted to them." Id. "Appeals
to prejudice, oversimplification of the issues, and exploitation of legitimate concerns by promising
simplistic solutions to complex problems often characterize referendum and initiative campaigns."
Id. at 19.
Although Bell concedes that "politicians, too, may offer quick cure-alls to gain electoral support
and may spend millions on election campaigns that are as likely to obfuscate as to elucidate the
issues," he asserts that "[o]nce in office, they may become well-informed, responsible representatives." Id. at 19-20. Bell adds that "at the least, [representatives'] excesses may be curtailed by the
checks and balances of the political process." Id. at 20.
Julian Eule also contends that representatives are more likely than plebiscite voters to engage in
deliberation. He argues that "[p]opular masses too quickly form preferences, fail adequately to consider the interests of others, and are overly susceptible to contagious passions and the deceit of
eloquent and ambitious leaders." Eule, supra note 1, at 1526-27. Worse, the substitutive plebiscite
"has little capacity for deliberation," id. at 1555 (emphasis added), according to Eule. "Public debate is infrequent. Exposure to minority perspectives occurs accidentally if at all .... Any efforts at
self-education are thwarted by manipulative campaigns designed to oversimplify the issues and appeal to the electorate's worst instincts." Id. at 1555-56.
Eule portrays lawmaking by representatives, in contrast, as a "deliberative process [which] offers time for reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occasions for transforming preferences."
Id. at 1527. According to Eule, "[o]ur worst tendencies toward prejudice . .. are chastened in
legislative debate." Id. at 1555. "Knowledge and exposure are effective weapons against prejudice.
Debate and deliberation inevitably lead to better informed judgment." Id. Through legislative hearings and the testimony of various interest groups, the legislator's exposure to competing ideas and
perspectives is enlarged, which "induces greater sensitivity and checks partiality." Id.
Eule concedes that "[n]o one would be so naive as to deny that [the] deliberative ideal [of the
legislature] breaks down with disturbing frequency," and that "the legislature often has trouble hearing voices from the margin." Id. at 1550. He observes, however, that "the process anticipates its
own frailties by subdividing lawmaking authority." Id. at 1551.
See also, e.g., Black, supra note 4, at 30-31, 49; Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking, supra note
4, at 743-46; Sager, supra note 4, at 1403, 1412, 1414-15.
104. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 4; Black, supra note 4, at 30-31, 49; Eule, supra note 1; Fountaine,
Note, Lousy Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 745; Sager, supra note 4, at 1412, 1414-15.
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I then compare representative bodies and plebiscites along several
other dimensions of deliberation that are not explicitly embodied in the
civic republican conception. I find that one cannot conclude a priorithat
representatives are systematically more likely than plebiscite voters to:
(1) be well-informed about legislation on which they vote, (2) more
thoughtfully and rationally consider the issues on which they vote, (3)
discuss an issue with fellow decisionmakers prior to voting, or (4) revise
one's preferences in light of discussion or new information.
I conclude this section by explaining how previous commentators
arrived at their contrary judgment that representative legislatures have a
greater capacity for, and are more likely actually to engage in, deliberation than plebiscites. I show that greater deliberation, in any case, would
not systematically result in a legislature's enactments being less likely
than those of a plebiscite to disadvantage a racial minority.
1. A Civic Republican Conception of Deliberation
Are representative legislatures systematically likely to engage in
more deliberation than plebiscites on any given issue? Any answer to
this question must begin by specifying what is meant by "deliberation."
Unfortunately, the commentators who have discussed this issue typically
have not explicitly defined the term. 0 5 Let us first, then, consider a conception of deliberation popular among republican theorists. Three aspects of this conception merit particular consideration: that decisions be
motivated by a concern with "the public good;" that they be explicitly
justified by appeals to "the public good;" and that the goal of deliberation
be agreement among the decisionmakers.
The requirement that decisions be motivated by a concern with "the
public good" is consistent with the civic republican view that deliberation
"embodies substantive limitations": 0 6 "[I]n their capacity as political
actors, citizens and representatives are not supposed to ask only what is
in their private interest, but also what will best serve the community in
general-understood as a response to the best general theory of social
welfare."' 0 7 Unfortunately, civic republicanism does not specify how a
political actor is to determine what "the public good" is.'0 8 Indeed, it is
105. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 4, at 18-20; Black, supra note 4, at 30-31, 49; Eule, supra note 1, at
1526-27, 1550-51, 1555-56; Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking, supra note 4, at 743-46; Sager,
supra note 4 at 1412, 1414-15.
106. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550 (1988).
107. Id. (footnote omitted).
108. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1599-1601 (1988);
Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1670 (1988); Jonathan R.
Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673, 1676-77 & n.16 (1988);
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not clear that any coherent content can be given the notion.'°9 Nor is it
therefore obvious how one is to determine whether representatives and
plebiscite voters differ systematically in their ability or willingness to be
motivated by "civic virtue" in their decisionmaking.
Despite this difficulty, Clayton Gillette has recently suggested that
plebiscite voters may be more likely than representatives to be motivated
in their decisionmaking by concern for "the public good."' "t 0 It is axiomatic that the expected personal costs of voting are likely to exceed the
expected personal benefits for most individuals."'I Gillette contends that
the fact that a substantial number of citizens nonetheless vote in plebiscites might be explained by these citizens' "preferences for activities that
foster deliberative or other forms of checks on self-interest."'" 2 He reasons that if the otherwise irrational act of voting "is explained by a sense
of duty, obligation, or beneficence towards others, deliberativeness appears to be an integral part of the voting process":" 3 "It would be
anomalous for a potential voter to proclaim that he had an obligation to
vote, but no similar obligation to consider how to vote."' " 4 The result,
according to Gillette, is that those who vote in plebiscites may also be
those more likely to deliberate before doing so." 5 And, the reasons voters enter the booth may well affect the policies for which they ultimately
vote. 1 16
H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1710-11 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1713 (1988).
109. Much of the difficulty is captured in the debate over whether there exists a unitary "public
good." See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 106, at 1540, and sources cited id. at n.2; Abrams, supra note
108, at 1599-1604; Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Orthe Flight from Substance, 97
YALE L.J. 1633, 1640 (1988); Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation,97 YALE L.J. 1685,
1698; Sullivan, supra note 108, at 1713.
Farber and Frickey contend, however, that
A legislative decision has a good claim to represent the public interest when individual
preferences on particular issues themselves generally fall into coherent ideological patterns;
when decisions are made using techniques that embody society's understandings about relevance; when norms of fair division are respected; and when the end result is preferred by a
majority to the status quo.
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 59 (citation omitted).

See also Hovenkamp, Legislation, supra note 65 (analyzing various mechanism for identifying
"social well-being").
110. Gillette, supra note 4, at 946-60.
111.

See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-74 (1957); Gil-

lette, supra note 4, at 946-47, 950, and sources cited therein.
112. Gillette, supra note 4, at 947 (emphasis added); see generally id. at 946-60.
113. Id. at 957.
114. Id.
115. Id. Gillette further contends that to the extent that "consumption benefits" explain voting,
those benefits "presumably correlate to effort expended." Id. Thus, the likelihood of receiving additional consumption benefits may cause the individual voter to engage in more pre-vote deliberation
of various sorts. Id. at 957-58.
116. Id. at 954. Gillette argues, "the motivations that lure voters to the voting booth simultane-
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There are several problems with Gillette's analysis. First, the sense
of duty or obligation that he (rightly, I believe) contends explains the
willingness of some voters to engage in the otherwise irrational act of
voting is not obviously other-regarding, nor is the act of voting therefore
obviously an act of "beneficence toward others." Rather, the obligation
to vote may be felt as an obligation formally to voice one's opinion or as a
duty simply to participate in the democratic system.
Second, the felt "obligation to consider how to vote," which Gillette
(rightly, I believe) claims is likely to attend a felt obligation to vote, does
not obviously require that the voter consider what "the public good" requires. It simply requires that the voter consider something in deciding
how to vote.
In sum, Gillette makes a plausible case that a felt duty to vote explains the willingness of some individuals to engage in the otherwise irrational act of voting, and that those who feel a duty to vote are likely also
to feel an obligation to consider how to vote. One cannot conclude, however, that plebiscite voters are therefore more likely than representatives
to be motivated in their decisionmaking by a concern for "the public
good."
Nonetheless, there is little reason to think that representatives are
systematically more likely than plebiscite voters to be guided by "the
public good" in their decisionmaking. First, an interest in being reelected competes favorably with consumption benefits as the explanation
for representatives' voting behavior. l11 A representative who fails to
ously and systematically induce other-regardingbehavior." Id. (emphasis added). Gillette acknowledges that "there is a darker side to the consumption benefits explanation of voting": "If self-interest
motivates the selection of benefits for consumption, it may be that those who have the narrowest selfinterest at heart, who are at the fringe, or whose 'dark urges' are most fanatic are the persons for
whom voting is the currency of choice." Id. at 958-59.
117. It is an axiom of political science and theory that legislators' primary, but not sole, concern
is winning reelection. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 5
(1990); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITIEES 1 (1973); DAVID R. MAYHEW,
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION, 5-7, 13-17, 37, 46-49 (1974); FRANK E. SMITH, CONGRESSMAN FROM MISSISSIPPI 127 (1964) ("All members of Congress have a primary interest in
getting re-elected. Some members have no other interest."); William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast,
ConstitutionalRegulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of JudicialDeference to
Legislators, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 396 (1988) (legislator is "a placeholder opportunistically building
up an ad hoc majority for the next election"); Mark Tushnet, Principles,Politics, and Constitutional
Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 49, 51-53 (1988). Under this view, legislators may pursue other goals,
including enacting their own visions of good public policy or achieving influence within the legislature, if reelection is not at risk. See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra, at 5; FENNO, supra, at I.
Recently, however, a lively debate has grown up around the extent to which legislators enact
their own ideological preferences rather than those of interest groups or their constituents. See, e.g.,
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 27 (economic theory of agency suggests that "legislators will
sometimes 'shirk,' acting in accord with their own preferences, rather than those of voters or interest
groups"); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 123, 143-50 (1989) (criticizing Farber and Frickey's analysis); William R.
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vote, even on issues about which she cares little and on which she is
highly unlikely to deliberate, faces charges of absenteeism and shirking
that may reduce her chances for reelection." 8 Thus, there is little reason
to believe that the representatives who vote on a given issue are also
those representatives more likely to consider "the public good" in their
decisionmaking.
There is another pertinent difference between the incentives of representatives and plebiscite voters. A representative is less likely to be
reelected if the median voter in her constituency believes that she voted
"the wrong way" on an important issue. Thus, to the extent that "the
public good" (defined somehow) dictates a result different from that preferred by the median voter in her constituency, a representative has an
incentive to ignore "the public good"-an incentive that a plebiscite
voter does not have. On the other hand, to the extent that "the public
good" dictates the same result that is preferred by the median voter in
her constituency, a representative has an incentive that the plebiscite
voter never does to be guided by "the public good" in her lawmaking.
Which of these two scenarios more often occurs is difficult to assess and,
of course, depends on how "the public good" is defined.
A second and related aspect of civic republican conceptions of deliberation is the requirement that political actors explicitly 'Justify their
choices by appealing to a broader public good."' 1 9 Some commentators
suggest that "[tihe requirement of appeal to public-regarding reasons
may make it more likely that public-regarding legislation [--defined
somehow-] will actually be enacted."' 20 Representatives may in fact be
better able than plebiscite voters to provide "public-regarding" justifications (defined somehow) for their legislative choices. The fact that a representative has waged a successful election campaign implies a relatively
Dougan & Michael C. Munger, The Rationality ofIdeology, 32 J.L. & ECON. 119 (1989); Joseph P.
Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent IdeologicalBehayiorof Legislators: Testingfor Principal-Agent
Slack in PoliticalInstitutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103 (1990) [hereinafter Kalt & Zupan, Slack]; Joseph
P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON.
REV. 279 (1984); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1979). See also sources cited in Kalt & Zupan, Slack, supra, at
103 n.1.
Farber and Frickey have made a persuasive case that "the best picture of the political process
... is a mixed model in which constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all help
determine legislative conduct." FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 33.
118. See Gillette, supra note 4, at 968; ARNOLD, supra note 117, at 62-63 ("challengers love to
use below-average voting [participation] scores as evidence that incumbents are not diligently doing
their jobs").
119. Sunstein, supra note 106, at 1544 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 1545, and sources cited id. at n.21. Sunstein acknowledges that it would "be a mistake to exaggerate the extent of this effect. Self-interested motivations may merely be concealed; the
requirement of deliberation can be an invitation to hypocrisy and deceit." Id. at 1545 n.2 1.
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good ability to talk in terms of the public good-or at least an ability to
tell voters what they want to hear. In addition, the median representative is likely to have greater lawmaking expertise and experience than the
median plebiscite voter. Plebiscitary measures are often drafted by professionals, however, whose lawmaking expertise and experience compete
121
favorably with those of the median representative.
Representatives and plebiscite voters may also differ systematically
in their willingness to provide public-regarding justifications for their legislative choices, but the direction of that difference is unclear. Certainly
the two groups have different incentives to give or withhold such justifications. A citizen's employer is unlikely ever to ask her to justify her
vote in a given plebiscite, much less fire her solely because of the reason
she gives.1 2 2 A representative, however, may well not be reelected if a
majority of her constituents do not like her justification for her (easily
monitored) vote on a particular issue.' 23 Thus, a representative inter121. Many initiatives are drafted by special campaign consultants "whose business is to draft a
proposition with maximum chances of electoral success." MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 60-61. In
addition, many initiatives are drawn from pending or recently defeated legislative bills. Id.
At present, six states formally offer drafting assistance to initiative proposers. In Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, and Washington state, all proposed initiatives are automatically referred to a legislative drafting office that makes non-binding suggestions and recommendations. See COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 1; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-101 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 34-1809
(Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-27-202 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.79.010 (Supp.
1992).
In the District of Columbia, the Board of Elections and Ethics is directed by statute to conform
all proposed ballot measures to the legislative drafting format of acts of the Council of the District of
Columbia, and "may consult experts in the field of legislative drafting" to do so. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-1320(c)(3) (1992).
California offers non-binding drafting assistance only when requested by 25 or more electors or
when there is a reasonable probability that the measure will ultimately be submitted to the voters.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 10243 (West 1992).
Empirical studies "consistently have concluded that the work-product of the initiative process
overall is at least the equal of, and often superior to, that of the legislative process. There is no
evidence from any extensive study that legislation enacted by initiative is, as a whole, . . . more
'poorly drafted'.., than the work product of the legislative branch." Allen, supra note 3, at 1010-11
(footnote omitted).
122. Certainly the secrecy of plebiscite ballots makes employer monitoring of employees' actual
votes difficult. This is, of course, a separate point from the fact that jobs are sometimes eliminated
by plebiscites as, for example, with budgetary ballot measures.
123. In recent years, abortion has been the issue most likely to have this potency. For example,
the pro-choice stance of Virginia's Governor Wilder, New Jersey's Governor Florio, and New York
City's Mayor Dinkins were thought to have played a major role in their respective victories at the
polls. See, e.g., Abortion, the Voters and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1989, at A20; Rochelle
Sharpe, Abortion Politics at Work, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 3, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File. Abortion was also a central issue in recent primaries and elections for
various public offices in California, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. See, e.g., Sharpe,
supra; Campaign Watch; Abortion Distortion, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1990, at M6; Mark Starr, Playing
Single-Issue Politics, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1989, at 22; Dan Balz, Abortion Issue Slows Iowa Democratic Frontrunner; Miller Laments NARAL "Hit-List" Politics as Gubernatorial Primary Lead Slips
After Attacks, WASH. POST, May 10, 1990, at A20; Dan Balz, Idaho Republicans Feeling Fallout
from Battle over Abortion, WASH. POST, May 4, 1990, at A4; Barry M. Horstman, Bentley Tries to
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ested in reelection is likely to provide a "public-regarding" explanation
for her vote only if she believes that a substantial portion of her constituents want to hear such a justification. Whether constituents want to hear
"public-regarding" justifications for representatives' votes more often
124
than other types of reasons (or no reason at all) is difficult to assess.
A third aspect of civic republican conceptions of deliberation is the
goal that all the political participants reach agreement. 125 That is, the
core of the political process is understood to be consensus-building
through conversation, rather than the mere bargaining over and aggregating of preferences. 126 On their face, however, the procedural rules of
both legislatures and plebiscites typically provide political actors incentives to secure the agreement of only a simple majority of fellow deciRefocus Campaign against Killea, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1989, at B1; Gerald Kopplin, High Iron
Range Voter Turnout Could Help Perpich, UPI, Sept. 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File.
Other single-issue issues through the years have included slavery, the coinage of gold and silver
money, the federal role in the construction of roads, the death penalty, state income taxes, and the
ERA. See, e.g., Arnold Sawislak, Washington Window Marching Forwardinto the Past, UPI, Nov.
20, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; John Holusha, Tax Increase Has 2 in Michigan Fightingfor Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1983, pt. 1, at 33; Mark Shields, Loyal-and Losingto ERA, WASH. POST, July 17, 1981, at A23.
In addition, although "[tihe recall process was originally designed to get rid of officials for gross
malfeasance or corruption in office," single-issue political groups have increasingly used the process
to advance their agendas. See, e.g., Joanne M. Haas, Democrat: Recall OrganizersShould Pay for
Election, UPI, March 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (quoting Rep. David
Travis, D-Madison).
That the realm of single-issue issues knows no bounds is apparent from the following:
At a time when single-issue politics has made lawmakers leery of sensitive issues, Mississippi legislators find themselves staring down the barrel of perhaps the most explosive
issue of them all.
It's not abortion. It's not taxes. It's deer dogs.
The question of how to regulate hunters who use dogs to flush deer out of the woods is
laced with issues of class, gun ownership and private-property rights. It pits Faulkner's
Snopeses against his Compsons and Mississippi's rural heritage against its creeping urbanization. It's got Bambi, money, violence, and this year even death.
"This is the most complex thing, politically and socially, you can imagine," said John
E. Stack of Meridian, president of the Mississippi Property Rights Association, which
wants more regulation of hunting deer with dogs. "It's the one issue no one wants to
touch. I asked one legislator, 'What's your least favorite topic, abortion or deer dogs?' He
said, 'I believe it's deer dogs.' "
Peter Applebome, Mississippi Journal-Hunting Is the Issue SurpassingAll Others, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb.
21, 1990, at A14.
It is important to note, however, that in the case of such controversial issues it is not clear that
any justification could be given that would appease voters who dislike the candidate's expressed
preference on the issue.
124. One could easily imagine constituents preferring that a representative provide the following
"self-interested" justification for her vote: "I voted for/against the proposed legislation because I
knew [from polls/talking with constituents] that a vast majority of my constituents wanted me to
vote that way. My job is to represent my constituents' preferences, not my own." Indeed, representatives might find this a particularly safe justification to give for their votes on unusually controversial
issues.
125. Sunstein, supra note 106, at 1554.
126. Id. at 1554-55.
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sionmakers, and few, if any incentives to seek greater agreement or
unanimity. In practice, proponents of legislation before both plebiscites
and representative bodies will likely strive to secure a supermajority of
votes, largely because of the uncertainty under which pre-vote lobbying
takes place: the outcome of the final vote cannot be known in advance. 127 Rules concerning filibusters and amendments provide additional incentives for proponents of legislation in representative bodies to
minimize the size of the opposing coalition.128 Analogously, proponents
of plebiscitary legislation will try to provide a threat of victory sufficiently credible to encourage potential opponents to conserve their resources rather than pursue a seemingly lost cause.
The conversational component of this aspect of deliberation may be
better met by plebiscites than legislatures. For proponents of plebiscitary
measures, logrolling and other forms of bargaining are usually not possible, and persuasion on the merits is therefore the only available route to
(super)majority agreement. 29 Representatives concerned with reelection, in contrast, are more likely to "sell" their votes to one another for
something that their constituents will prefer than they are to "give away"
their votes because they have been persuaded on the merits. In sum,
both the legislature and the plebiscite provide decisionmakers incentives
to secure the agreement of a supermajority of their fellows. There is reason to believe, however, that the plebiscitary (super)majority is more
likely than the legislative (super)majority to be achieved through persuasion on the merits rather than through logrolling or other forms of
bargaining.
In sum, one cannot conclude a priorithat legislative enactments are
systematically more likely than plebiscitary enactments to be the product
of deliberation as conceived by civic republican theorists.
2.

"Procedural" Aspects of Deliberation

There are four other, more "procedural" aspects of deliberation that
127. All else equal, [legislative] leaders prefer large coalitions because they provide the best
insurance for the future. Each proposal must survive a long series of majoritarian tests-in
committees, subcommittees, in House and Senate, and in authorization, appropriations,
and budget bills. Large majorities help to insure that a bill clears these hurdles with ease.
ARNOLD, supra note 117, at 117-18. See also, R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE 43-44, 52 (1979); MAYHEW, supra note 117, at 111-15 (contrary
to Riker's theory, actual distribution of votes in both federal and state legislatures is "bimodal, with

a mode in the marginal range (50-59.9 percent) and a mode in the unanimity or near-unanimity
range (90-100 percent)"); RIKER, supra note 86.
128. See ARNOLD, supra note 117, at 117-118; MAYHEW, supra note 117, at 119-21.
129. See supra Part II.B. To be sure, these attempts at persuasion may sometimes be no more
"substantive" than a soundbite.
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are not embodied in the civic republican conception13 0 with its "substantive limitations."' 3' First, deliberation requires that one be well-informed about proposed legislation. This includes being knowledgeable
about competing-and minority-ideas, needs, and perspectives. Second, it requires that this information be thoughtfully and rationally considered rather than reacted to emotionally. Thoughtful and rational
consideration will typically be more time consuming than purely emotional reaction. Third, deliberation requires that one be able to discuss
and exchange views on proposed legislation with other decisionmakers, if
one chooses. Fourth, deliberation requires openmindedness. One's preferences must be revisable in light of discussion, debate, and new
information.
An examination of each of the above four aspects shows the question of whether representative legislatures are likely to engage in more
deliberation than plebiscites to be a much harder one than previous commentators have suggested. First, it is not at all clear that representatives
are systematically more likely than plebiscite voters to be well-informed
about legislation on which they vote. To be sure, the median state legislator may be better educated than the median plebiscite voter.132 In addition, lawmaking is something that plebiscite voters engage in only
occasionally, 33 but is a paid and staff-assisted (if frequently part-time)
job for state representatives. 134 As representatives fulfill the basic requirements of their jobs, such as attending hearings and meeting with
130. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 4, at 18-20; Eule, supra note 1,at 1526-27, 1550-51, 1555-56.
Julian Eule's conception of deliberation also seems to embody a particular substantive result:
"Public debate among those of equal status and eloquence thus ultimately leads to realization of the
common good." Id. at 1527. He is careful to distinguish this from a "utopian account" of deliberation according to which "legislators listen to one another because they are virtuous and because they
share a common goal of discovering the public good." Id. Eule adds that it is "no small part of the
Federalists' genius that their design achieves many of its aims even when the actors fail to play their
roles as hoped." Id.
131. Sunstein, supra note 106, at 1550.
132. The median educational level of members of the U.S. Senate in 1991 was a law degree (19
years of formal education completed). See THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1992 (1991).
Even assuming that state legislators are less well educated than their federal counterparts (no official
statistics appear to have been published), their median number of years of formal education completed is still likely to be higher than that for the general population (12.7 years); U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at 138 (11 th ed. 1991) [hereinafter 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. And even though the median plebiscite voter is likely to be
better educated than the median American of voting age, see MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 80-81, one
would still expect the median state legislator to have completed relatively more years of formal
education. See CRONIN, supra note 1, at 198.
133. See supra note 2.
134. At present, 41 legislatures meet annually. Six meet biennially in odd years (Arkansas,
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas), while the Kentucky legislature meets in even
years. The legislatures of Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont are supposed to meet
in odd years, but usually split their working days between odd and even years. The California
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lobbyists and constituents, they necessarily acquire information about
proposed legislation. Moreover, this same information may frequently be
useful as representatives later consider other legislation, thereby minimizing the amount of education necessary for them to be well-informed
on each new piece of legislation. Finally, a representative's interest in
being reelected provides an incentive to appear well-informed about
pending legislation when speaking to constituent groups and the media,
which may frequently result in a representative actually being wellinformed.
On the other hand, representatives are regularly confronted with decisions on many more issues than are plebiscite voters, vastly reducing
the time and energy that representatives and their staffs can devote to
gathering and processing information on any one issue.1 3 5 In addition,
pending and prospective legislation are not the sole (or even primary)
concern of representatives or their staff. 136 Legislation is undoubtedly a
significant concern of representatives since frequently failing to vote at all
("absenteeism" and "shirking") or voting "the wrong way" on important
issues can severely and adversely affect one's chances of reelection. But a
representative will frequently be able to maximize her chances of reelection simply by voting "the party line" or by voting according to her own
previous record on similar issues and, therefore, without becoming wellinformed about the actual piece of legislation at issue. Indeed, a representative's interest in being reelected may cause her to channel more resources toward learning the preference of the median voter in her
constituency with regard to any given piece of legislation than toward
legislature meets from the first Monday in January of each odd-numbered year until November 30 of
the next even-numbered year. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 1, at 137-40.
The lengths of legislative sessions also vary greatly, ranging from 30 working days in Alabama
to 120 working days in Minnesota and five and one-half months in Delaware and Missouri. Fourteen states have no limits on the length of legislative sessions. Id.
As of February 1992, yearly salaries for state legislators range from $100 in New Hampshire,
$4,267 (odd years) in South Dakota, and $7,125 in Maine, to $47,000 in Pennsylvania, $52,500 in
California, and $57,500 in New York. Travel allowances and other benefits, including retirement
benefits, vary greatly among the states. Id. at 151-65.
Budgets for staff, clerical assistance, and office expenses vary greatly among the states. Id. at
153-56.
135. In the 1991 regular session, the number of bills introduced in state legislatures ranged from
less than 700 in Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming, to 15,506
in New York. Id. at 183-85. Compare these statistics for state legislatures to the statistics for plebiscitary ballot measures supra note 2.
136. The classic account of how legislators' desire for reelection affects the activities in which
they engage is MAYHEW, supra note 117, at 49-77 (legislators find it "electorally useful" to engage in
three types of behavior: advertising, credit-claiming, and constituent casework).
See also supra note 117; BRUCE CAIN, JOHN FEREJOHN & MORRIS FIORINA, THE PERSONAL
VOTE (1987); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (1973).
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learning about the legislation itself. 13 7 Moreover, the threat of being
branded a "shirker" may induce representatives to vote even on legislation in which they (and their constituents) have little interest and about
which they are therefore relatively uninformed. 138 Plebiscite voters have
no comparable incentive to vote on legislation about which they know or
care little.'

39

One might expect any interest group concerned to enact a particular
law to attempt first to do so through the legislature, ceterisparibus. Collective action theory (and common sense) suggest that an interest group
can less efficiently and successfully lobby the voting population at large
than a discrete and insular segment of the population (representatives)
with a unified interest in obtaining a benefit that an interest group has to
offer (reelection). 1 40 Thus, one might expect a standing interest group to
attempt to enact legislation through a plebiscite only (1) when the legislature has refused to act (or to act favorably) on the matter, (2) when the
interest group's goal is the repeal of legislation recently enacted by the
legislature, or (3) when the interest group seeks to constrain the power of
the legislature.1 41 In addition, some ad hoc interest groups with particularly controversial or urgent concerns may decide that they are more
likely to achieve success through a plebiscite than through the legislature, and may therefore take the matter to the People first.142
Once legislation is actually pending in the legislature or has been
placed on a plebiscite ballot, however, a concerned interest group should
be equally likely to provide voters and representatives their views on, and
pertinent information concerning, that legislation. Assuming that each
interest group's goal is to affect the outcome of the legislative process, its
incentives to persuade plebiscite voters and representatives should at this
point be the same. Although lobbying efforts may well take systematically different forms in the case of representatives (personal visits, campaign contributions, honoraria) and plebiscite voters (direct mailings,
telephoning, flyers, posters, mass media advertising), the latter group is
137.
138.
139.
140.

See supra note 117.
See supra note 118.
See supra note 54.
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 38-49 (1982); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF

COLLECTIVE ACTION 53-65 (1965); Ackerman, supra note 74, at 724-26; Gillette, supra note 4, at
981.
141. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 60; Briffault, supra note 4, at 1371; Gillette, supra note
4, at 982; Lowenstein, Campaign Spending, supra note 4, at 567-68.
142. This "safety valve" function of the plebiscitary lawmaking option may operate in tandem
with that served by federalism under Jonathan Macey's account. Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-ChoiceExplanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990).
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not obviously more expensive for interest groups to lobby and educate. 4 3
Indeed, large differentials in lobbying costs for the two groups are most
likely to arise when successful lobbying of representatives also requires
successful lobbying of the voters who elect the representatives. 144 There
is, in short, little reason to expect that an interest group will. find it more
costly-or will, therefore, be less likely-to provide its views on, and pertinent information concerning, pending legislation to plebiscite voters
than to representatives. And, to summarize, wide variation both among
representatives and among plebiscite voters seems more likely than systematic differences between the two groups in the extent of their information about legislation.
Second, it is not at all clear that the median plebiscite voter is systematically inferior to the median representative in the extent to which
she engages in thoughtful and rational consideration of the issues on
which she votes. The median state legislator may be more intelligent and
better educated than the average plebiscite voter, and those traits may
correlate positively with a capacity for thoughtful and rational consideration of legislation. A representative's interest in being reelected, however, provides no particular incentive actually to engage in thoughtful
and rational consideration of an issue before she votes. Rather, as has
already been noted, she will frequently be able to maximize her chances
of reelection by voting according to the preference of the median voter in
her constituency, by voting "the party line," or by voting according to
her own previous record on similar issues. In addition, as discussed
above, the threat of being branded a "shirker" at reelection time may
induce representatives to vote even on legislation that they have not
thoughtfully and rationally considered. Plebiscite voters have no comparable external incentives to vote on matters in which they have little
interest.
A third "procedural" aspect of deliberation is that decisionmakers
discuss and exchange views on proposed legislation with other decisionmakers. Although there are obvious systematic differences between
143. For discussions of the relationship between campaign spending and the success of ballot
propositions, see, e.g., TIPS Task Force Report, supra note 39; CRONIN, supra note 1, at 99-124;
PHILIP L. DuBois & FLOYD F. FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OP-

TIONS FOR CHANGE 143-59 (1992) (publication of the California Policy Seminar, "a joint program of
the University of California and state government"); MAGLEBY, supra note 1, 145-65; SCHMIDT,
supra note 1, at 35; Allen, supra note 3, at 1028-38; Lowenstein, CampaignSpending, supra note 4;
Mastro et al., supra note 4.
144. This is most likely to occur when an issue is controversial and likely to attract "single issue
voters," and a representative, therefore, needs special reassurance that her vote on the issue will not
ultimately cost her her seat. The abortion issue may be the best current example. See supra note
123.
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representatives and plebiscite voters regarding the forums in which such
discussion and debate occur, there is little evidence of systematic differences in the extent of the two groups' opportunities. At nearly any hour
of the day or night, both representatives and plebiscite voters are able to
discuss proposed legislation with their fellow decisionmakers. For both
groups, the opportunities for discussion and debate are both formal and
informal. Representatives hold committee hearings and participate in
floor debates; similarly, plebiscite voters can attend hearings held by local government agencies and participate in various forms of "town meetings." Less formally, representatives talk in the proverbial "cloakroom"
and lobby each other over lunch and on the golf course. Plebiscite voters, analogously, can discuss proposed legislation in their workplaces and
schools, on radio talk shows and in the local press, at social and recreational clubs, with their friends and neighbors, and at meetings of civic
and voluntary organizations.

145

There is equally little reason to expect systematic differences between representatives and plebiscite voters in the actual amount of discussion of proposed legislation in which the two groups engage. To be
sure, such discussion is part of a representative's paid job, but that does
not necessarily mean that she will be systematically more likely than the
ordinary voter to exchange views with fellow decisionmakers on a given
issue. As has already been noted, proposed legislation is not the sole (or
even primary) concern of representatives. 14 6 In addition, representatives
are regularly confronted with decisions on many more issues than are
plebiscite voters, vastly reducing the time and energy that representatives
can devote to discussing any one issue with their legislative colleagues. 147
Moreover, the committee system of most legislatures means that an exchange of views on any given issue is likely to be concentrated in the
small subset of representatives on the pertinent committee.148 To the extent other representatives support the committee's recommendation,
their votes may often represent a proxy given to the committee rather
than any independent discussion of the matter with fellow decisionmakers. Thus, wide variation among both representatives and plebi145. This comports with the "historically American" and "non-state centered notion of republican citizenship" recently discussed by a variety of legal scholars. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 74, at 1531; Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96
YALE L.J. 1860, 1861-62 (1987); Sunstein, supra note 106, at 1572-73.
146. See supra note 136.
147. See supra note 135.
148. See ARNOLD, supra note 117, at 85-87; FENNO, supra note 117; KINGDON, supra note 136,
at 69-104.
For a listing of the standing committees of the state legislatures during the 1991 regular session,
see THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 1, at 191-92.
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scite voters-and across issues-seems more likely than systematic
differences between the two groups in the extent to which individuals
discuss a given issue with fellow decisionmakers prior to voting.
Finally, wide variation among both representatives and plebiscite
voters in the degree of openmindedness and of the revisability of preferences also seems more likely than systematic differences between the two
groups. If one considers openmindedness to be an intellectual trait that
is positively correlated with intelligence and years of formal education,
one would expect the median representative to exhibit more of it than the
median plebiscite voter. 149 In addition, a substantial proportion of individuals who bother to vote in a plebiscite at all may do so because they
have unusually passionate, and therefore unrevisable, opinions on an issue.150 The revisability of representatives' preferences, however, may be
equally severely constrained by concern with reelection and therefore
with the preferences of one's constituents, the position taken on the matter by one's political party, or one's own previous voting record and
ideology.
3.

Reconciling the Existing Commentary

The above analysis leads to the conclusion that plebiscites are not a
priori inferior to legislatures in either their capacity for, or their actual
willingness and ability to engage in, deliberation under any of several
different conceptions. It therefore seems important to understand how
legal scholars have arrived at the contrary judgment that representative
legislatures have a greater capacity for, and are more likely actually to
engage in, deliberation than plebiscites. 15 1 Implicit (sometimes explicit)
in such analyses is the critical assumption that representatives are largely
concerned with effecting "the public good," while plebiscite voters are
guided solely by self interest. Thus, Derrick Bell, for example, portrays
the plebiscite voter as driven by emotion, prejudice, and solipsistically
personal preferences, while representatives are "responsible" (presumably to some notion of "the public good") and well-informed.

152

Simi-

larly, Julian Eule contends that "[p]opular masses too quickly form
preferences, fail adequately to consider the interests of others, and are
overly susceptible to contagious passions ....
,,153 Representatives, in
contrast, are engaged in a "deliberative process [which] offers time for
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See supra note 132.
See supra note 54.
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 4, at 18-20; Eule, supra note 1, at 1526-27, 1550-51, 1555-56.
Bell, supra note 4, at 18-20.
Eule, supra note 1, at 1526-27.
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reflection [-presumably on "the public good"-], exposure to competing needs, and occasions for transforming preferences."' 154
In brief, both Bell and Eule consistently employ an interest group or
pluralist model of lawmaking by ordinary citizens, but a republican or
public-interest model of lawmaking by legislatures. 155 In Eule's words,
"naked preferences emerge from a plebiscite," 15 6 while the products of
representative legislatures "represent far more than a simple aggregation
of majority will.' 1

57

By consistently using different models to describe

the two legislative processes-models that differ precisely along the dimension of "deliberation"-Bell and Eule predetermine the outcome of
their comparative analyses of legislatures' and plebiscites' capacities for,
and actual engagement in, deliberation.
4.

The Relationship between Deliberation and Discrimination

Taken as a whole, the above analysis suggests that one cannot conclude a priori that representatives are systematically likely to engage in
more deliberation (of any sort) than plebiscite voters. Assuming arguendo, however, that scholar's claims to the contrary are correct, would
the legislature's greater amount of deliberation mean that its enactments
will be systematically less likely than those of plebiscites to disadvantage
racial minorities? There seems little reason to think so. Four of the
seven aspects of deliberation discussed above can as readily result in a
vote in favor of, as a vote against, legislation that disadvantages a racial
minority. That lawmakers are (1) well informed, (2) openminded, and
(3) willing and able to discuss proposed legislation with other decisionmakers (4) in order to build a consensus, imposes no substantive constraint on the outcome of the legislative process.
Each of the remaining three aspects of deliberation discussed above,
however, embodies something closer to a substantive constraint on the
outcomes of the lawmaking process. Indeed, both Derrick Bell and Julian Eule imply that certain outcomes are less likely when lawmakers (1)
engage in thoughtful, rational, and unemotional consideration of issues,
154. Id. at 1527.
155. For detailed descriptions of these two models of lawmaking, see, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 6, at 13-14, 44-45; Michelman, supra note 74; Sunstein, supra note 106; Cass R. Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
Farber and Frickey have recently argued that "[diespite the apparent conflict between these two
forms of political theory, . . . there is a deeper connection between them. Properly understood,
public choice theory can support the republican vision of deliberative democracy." FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 8.
156. Eule, supra note 1, at 1551.
157. Id. at 1532.
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(2) are guided in their decisionmaking by concern for "the public good,"
and/or (3) explicitly justify their decisions by appeals to "the public
good."' 158 And scholars of both "civic republicanism" and "social
choice" such as Cass Sunstein, 159 Frank Michelman, 16° and Robert
Goodin 1 6 ' have explicitly claimed that these (and other) aspects of deliberation are likely to reduce the incidence of "discriminatory" legislation-legislation that one "cannot believe that a rational member of th[e]
disadvantaged class could ever approve of. .... ,162
As has already been noted, however, the notion of "the public good"
is neither obvious nor uncontroversial in its content.1 63 Indeed much
(all?) legislation is controversial precisely because both its passage and its
defeat are perceived to impose costs on one group and benefits on another. "Rationality" and concern for "the public good" will, of course,
preclude legislation that disadvantages a racial minority if these terms
are specifically defined to do so. 164 But to thus define the two terms is to
beg the very question of whether there is an inverse correlation between a
legislature's capacity for deliberation and the likelihood that its enactments disadvantage racial minorities.
III.

REMEDIES AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

Parts I and II have argued that a rationally self-interested racial
minority's preference between representative and direct democracy is a
158. See Bell, supra note 4, generally, but especially at 18-20; Eule, supra note 1, generally, but
especially at 1526-27, 1550-51, 1555-56.
159. Sunstein, supra note 106, at 1543 n. 14, 1547-58. Cass Sunstein's belief in the "public interested" powers of deliberation is further evidenced by the school of statutory interpretation that he
helped found, which has as its normative goal the encouraging of deliberation-and the preventing
of "naked redistributions"-by legislative bodies. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 106; Sunstein, supra
note 155; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689
(1984).
160. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 74, at 1504 (applauding the sensitivity of
republicanism to "the dependence of good politics on social and economic conditions capable of
sustaining 'an informed and active citizenry that would not permit its government either to exploit
or dominate one part of society or to become its instrument' "); Michelman, Foreword,supra note 74,
at 33 ("themes of dialogue" in republicanism "emphasize openness to 'otherness' ").
161.

Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences,in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

75, 86-91 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986).
162. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring), quoted in Sunstein, supra note 106, at 1569 n. 170. See also supra text accompanying notes 1314.
163. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
164. It is, of course, the case that in America in the 1990s, there is a popular consensus that "the
public good" precludes unconstitutional discrimination against racial minorities. The question at
issue, however, is the harder one of whether certain types of legislation that disadvantage racial
minorities are, or should be found to be, unconstitutionally discriminatory. It seems fair to say that
on issues such as bussing, affirmative action, and "English only" laws, to take just a few examples,
there is no clear popular consensus as to what "the public good" dictates.
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difficult empirical question and cannot confidently be resolved on the
strength of a priori reasoning. If one nonetheless believes that representative lawmaking processes systematically provide racial minorities better protection against disadvantageous legislation than do plebiscites,
however, the question remains as to what, if anything, should be done.
In this Part, I show first that simply abolishing plebiscites is neither politically feasible nor especially desirable. I then take up scholars' suggestions that the courts subject plebiscitary legislation to a "harder judicial
look" under equal protection doctrine than the enactments of representative bodies. Close examination reveals such disparate judicial treatment
to be neither necessary nor desirable. I conclude that those interested in
providing racial minorities greater protection from potentially disadvantageous plebiscitary legislation might more productively focus their attention on remedying any perceived defects in existing plebiscitary
procedures.
A. Abolish Plebiscites?
If one believes, contrary to the analysis in Part II above, that representative bodies are systematically less likely than plebiscites to enact legislation that disadvantages racial minorities, one obvious solution would
be for states and localities to abolish substitutive plebiscites. This option
is not likely to be politically feasible, however. 165 Nor, as even many
critics of plebiscites concede, 166 would it be clearly desirable. The substitutive plebiscite has uncontroversial benefits that may well exceed the
costs of the allegedly inferior protection it provides racial minorities
against disadvantageous legislation.
First, the substitutive plebiscite increases the breadth of participation in the drafting and enacting of legislation. Many successful initiatives have been the product of "forces outside the power elite who are not
usually successful at the ordinary politics of working the lobbies of the
165. Recent polls conducted in various states reveal that plebiscites are enormously popular in
states that have them, and are much desired in states that do not. CRONIN, supra note 1, at 203 n. 10.
It is further interesting that during the past 20 years, 12 states that do not currently provide for
plebiscites considered direct democracy devices at constitutional conventions or in legislative debates
and hearings. In no state, has the abolition of plebiscites been equally seriously considered. Id. at 51
(table 3.1).
166. Bell, for example, states that "[b]lacks and other minorities neither seek nor need absolute
protection against the dangers they face from direct democracy." Bell, supra note 4, at 22. Rather,
both the problem and its solution lie in the courts. Id. at 22-28. Eule observes approvingly that the
electorate sometimes "acts to improve the processes of legislative representation," Eule, supra note 1,
at 1559, and that "[p]lebiscites serve as an escape valve for the frustrations of day-to-day encounters

with faceless, unresponsive, and oppressive bureaucracies."

Id. at 1585.
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State House."' 167 The initiative process is also sometimes used by state
legislators or governors unable to achieve their legislative goals through
the representative legislature.1 68 Without the alternative lawmaking
channel of the plebiscite, a substantial portion of these issues might never
have received serious consideration. 169
The substitutive plebiscite also casts a shadow over representatives'
agendas and deliberations, making them more responsive to popular concerns and desires.1 70 Many more initiatives fail than succeed, 17 1 but even
unsuccessful measures can have important effects. They can cause the
representative legislature to consider issues that would not normally be
high on its agenda, while simultaneously providing those lawmaking "experts" a grace period in which to act before the "amateurs" generate
72
enough grassroots support to pass their own version of the measure.
A third important function of the substitutive plebiscite is the
"safety valve" it provides for particularly volatile issues that state legislators, concerned with reelection, might not want to handle. 7 3 It is noteworthy that many landmark reforms that were highly controversial at
the time of enactment began as initiatives in various states: women's suf167. Briffault, supra note 4, at 1357-58; CRONIN, supra note 1,at 224-25.
168. These elected representatives may resort to direct democracy because they are consistently
in the minority in the legislature, or because of legislative gridlock. CRONIN, supra note 1, at 202-03,
211; Michael deCourcy Hinds, FrustratedGovernors Bypass Legislators With Voter Initiatives, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at Al0 (" 'If we continue to have gridlocked governments, then not only will
we see more initiatives by politicians but we'll also see more states adopt the initiative process.' ").
169. Briffault, supra note 4, at 1357, 1370-72.
170. Id. at 1372.
171. Only "35 to 40 percent of the more than 1,500 citizen-initiated ballot measures considered
since 1904 have won voter approval." CRONIN, supra note 1, at 197. See also Lowenstein, Campaign Spending, supra note 4, at 548; MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 167; Allen, supra note 3, at 1036
("Close to two-thirds of the statewide measures that have appeared on the ballot have lost, a figure
that has remained remarkably stable over time."); SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 211-15.
The explanation most often given for the low initiative passage rate is that voters have a "predisposition" to vote "no" on initiatives. MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 167; Allen, supra note 3, at
1016-17, 1036 ("usually the voter seems, quite sensibly, to resolve any doubts he has on a particular
measure against it"); Briffault, supra note 4, at 1356-57, 1359, 1366. Indeed, "[o]n issues other than
those on which voters have standing opinions, there is a predictable movement from general support
for the proposition in the early campaign to its rejection as the campaign proceeds." MAGLEBY,
supra note 1,at 167-68; Lowenstein, CampaignSpending, supra note 4, at 549; Allen, supra note 3, at
1037.
Lowenstein, however, contends that the low initiative passage rate "does not necessarily ...
reflect any voter predisposition to vote 'no' on initiatives ...." Rather, "voters may simply consider
each proposition on the merits, without significant predisposition one way or the other." Indeed,
Lowenstein argues that if voters had a strong predisposition to vote "no," we would expect to see
"initial low levels of support, which would increase during the campaign as information and arguments sufficed for some voters to overcome the predisposition to vote 'no.' " Lowenstein, Campaign
Spending, supra note 4, at 548-49.
172. Allen, supra note 3, at 1036-38; Briffault, supra note 4, at 1372.
173. CRONIN, supra note 1, at 11, 199, 205, 229; Briffault, supra note 4, at 1371. Cf Macey,
supra note 142.
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frage, the abolition of poll taxes, prohibition and antiprohibition measures, the eight-hour work day, campaign finance regulations, and
establishment of the nation's first presidential primary system, to name
1
but a few.

74

Finally, substitutive plebiscites provide citizens the important consumption good of direct political participation. 75 In addition, there is
evidence that opportunities for this form of participation result in an
overall decrease in voter apathy and ignorance and, therefore, an increase
176
in the overall level of "civic virtue."'
B.

More Intrusive Judicial Review

Several scholars have proposed a less drastic remedy for the inferior
protection against disadvantageous legislation which they contend plebiscites provide racial minorities: more intrusive judicial review of the enactments of substitutive plebiscites than of representative bodies. 177
Derrick Bell, for example, argues that popular sovereignty processes
present a threat to minority rights "largely because the Supreme Court,
for the most part, refuses to alter or strike down laws which, although
neutral in form, function to promote racial discrimination."'178 He takes
particular issue with the intent or purpose test of modem equal protection doctrine: "Unfortunately, the racial motivations and discriminatory
impact of many modem referenda and initiatives cannot ... be attacked
directly because the measures are couched in racially neutral terms and
may be viewed as serving some legitimate, nonracial public purpose. ' 179
Bell suggests that "as a first step," the courts might give heightened scrutiny1 80 to ballot legislation in which the majority attempts to "take away
something the minority obtained through the representative system."'' 8
Julian Eule similarly contends that "[i]n its substitutive form, direct
democracy bypasses internal safeguards designed to filter out or negate
factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and self-interest."'' 8 2 By way of a rem.174. CRONIN, supra note 1, at 50-52, 59, 97-98, 199; Allen, supra note 3, at 1021-26.
175. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 115 (1963); Gillette, supra note 4, at 951,
957-58; Sunstein, supra note 155, at 36; Michelman, Forward,supra note 74, at 22; Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 548 (1986).
176. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 4, at 951; CRONIN, supra note 1, at 11.
177. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 4; Judicial Review, supra note 4; Eule, supra note 1; Gunn, supra
note 4.
178. Bell, supra note 4, at 23.
179. Id. at 24. Unfortunately, Bell never explains why the same complaint could not be levied
against the enactments of representative legislatures.
180. Bell's actual phrase is "[c]ourt scrutiny," id. at 26, but he seems to mean "heightened scrutiny." See id. at 23-24.
181. Id.
182. Eule, supra note 1, at 1549.
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edy, he suggests that courts should "take a harder look when constitutional challenges are mounted against laws enacted by substitutive
plebiscite."'' 8 3 Eule describes several ways this harder judicial look
might be achieved in the context of equal protection claims. First, we
could "abandon the purpose requirement altogether in certain plebiscitary settings,"' 8 4 in effect employing a "disparate impact" test for unconstitutional discrimination. 8 5 This suggested change in standard is partly
driven by proof concerns: "The search for a bigoted decision-maker
seems particularly elusive in the context of substitutive plebiscites," since
voting is private and the lower federal courts have barred inquiry into the
motivations of individual voters.' 8 6 Eule also notes that in the equal protection context this harder judicial look might be achieved by courts
"be[ing] more imaginative about the sources [they] canvass-for example, ballot pamphlets, exit polls, campaign advertising"-for proof of dis87
criminatory motivation.'
From these discussions one might expect the United States Reports
to be littered with instances in which the Court has upheld arguably racially discriminatory legislation enacted by plebiscites. In fact, the Court
has heard only four cases in which plebiscitary legislation was challenged
as racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.188
Applying the same equal protection standards that it applies to the enactments of representative bodies, the Court found that three of the four
plebiscitary enactments violated the Equal Protection Clause. 8 9 Of the
183. Id. at 1558. Eule argues that "[tihe judiciary must compensate for these process defects. It
must serve as the first line of defense for minority interests; a back-up role is no longer adequate.
The absence of structural safeguards demands that the judge take a harder look." Id. at 1549. The
only exception is where "the electorate acts to improve the processes of legislative representation"
because "[t]hese measures install new filters rather than seeking to bypass the existing ones." Id. at
1559-60. As examples, Eule cites measures to enforce ethics in government, to regulate lobbyists, or
to reform campaign finance practices, all of which he asserts "pose no distinctive threat of
majoritarian tyranny." Id.
184. Id. at 1562.
185. Id. at 1561-62. See also Gunn, supra note 4, at 158-59.
186. Eule, supra note I at 1561. See Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir.
1981) (First Amendment "assures every citizen the right to 'cast his vote for whatever reason he
pleases' "); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 1986) ("a court cannot ask voters
how they voted or why they voted that way"); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union
City, 424 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1970) (inquiry into voters' motives "would entail an intolerable
invasion of the privacy that must protect an exercise of the franchise"). See also Sager, supra note 4,
at 1421 ("Th[e] solicitude for the sanctity of individual choice in the electoral context logically
extends to legislative plebiscites.").
187. Eule, supra note 1 at 1562. See also Bell, supra note 4, at 24 n.91.
188. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967). It should be noted that these are the only such cases in which the Court explicitly notes the
popular origin of the challenged state statute or constitutional provision.
189. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457; Hunter, 393 U.S. 385; Reitman, 387 U.S. 369.
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two such cases that the Court has heard under "modern" equal protection law, it upheld the challenged legislation in one and invalidated it in
the other.' 90
In the remainder of this Part, I will argue that even if previous
scholars are correct and representative legislatures do systematically provide racial minorities better protection against disadvantageous legislation than do substitutive plebiscites, it is neither necessary nor desirable
that the courts respond to equal protection challenges by more intrusively reviewing the enactments of substitutive plebiscites. First, there is
little evidence that any differences in the two lawmaking processes will
make it more difficult for courts to identify unconstitutionally discriminatory legislation under existing equal protection standards if it is enacted by a plebiscite rather than by a representative legislature. Second,
these proposals for a harder judicial look seemingly misunderstand the
nature and operation of the intent test in modern equal protection law.
Third, implicit in these proposals is a doctrine of due process of lawmaking, which the Court and most commentators have in other contexts considered to be neither workable nor desirable.
1. The Effects of Filters
Assuming arguendo that the presence of various filters does enable
representative bodies to provide racial minorities better protection
against disadvantageous legislation than substitutive plebiscites, it is important to understand the effect of this difference. Both Bell and Eule
seem to contend that the courts will therefore find it more difficult to
identify unconstitutionally discriminatory legislation under existing equal
protection standards if it is enacted by a plebiscite rather than by a representative legislature. 19 ' In fact, the only logical result of the "better protection" allegedly provided minorities by the various filters embodied in
the representative lawmaking process is a lower likelihood that unconstitutionally discriminatory legislation-as measured by a constant standard-emerges from a legislature than from a plebiscite.
190. Compare Crawford, 458 U.S. 527 (plebiscitary enactment sustained), with Seattle School
District, 458 U.S. 457 (plebiscitary enactment found unconstitutional).
191. Bell contends, for example, that "the racial motivations and discriminatory impact of many
modem referenda and initiatives cannot.., be attacked directly because the measures are couched in
racially neutral terms and may be viewed as serving some legitimate, nonracial public purpose."
Bell, supra note 4, at 24. Unfortunately, Bell never explains why the same criticism cannot be levied
against the enactments of representative legislatures.
Eule similarly focuses on the intent requirement of modem equal protection doctrine, arguing
that "[t]he search for a bigoted decision-maker seems particularly elusive in the context of substitutive plebiscites." Eule, supra note i, at 1561.
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This finding would not lead to the conclusion that the courts should
subject plebiscitary legislation to a harder judicial look than enactments
by representative bodies. We would simply expect the courts-employing a constant standard of unconstitutionality-to hear a higher proportion of successful equal protection claims concerning the enactments of
92
plebiscites than of representatives, ceteris paribus.1
Oddly, neither Bell nor Eule even mentions this implication of their
claims. Rather, both seem concerned that the courts will find it more
difficult to identify unconstitutionally discriminatory legislation if it is
enacted by a plebiscite rather than by a legislature.1 93 It is not clear,
however, that this is likely to be the case. First, there is no reason to
expect the drafters of initiatives to be either better at couching discriminatory legislation in racially neutral terms, or more likely to engage in
this form of subterfuge, than representatives. Indeed, the greater lawmaking expertise of representatives, as well as their unique interest in
being reelected, might lead one to be more suspicious of the true motives
1 94
underlying their enactments.
Second, although the difficulties in determining the motivation of a
group of decisionmakers are well known, 195 they do not obviously dimin192. Alas, ceteraesunt raropares, and no good empirical evidence on this point exists or is likely
to be generated. Cf Gillette, supra note 4, at 938-39.
193. See supra notes 179, 186-87 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 102, 117, 121 and accompanying text.
195. In The Forum of Principle, Ronald Dworkin described the following as "common ground
between the rival schools on constitutional intention":
It is often problematical what a particular congressman or delegate to a constitutional
convention intended in voting for a particular constitutional provision, especially one of the
vaguer provisions, like the equal protection or due process clause. Indeed, a particular
delegate might have had no intention at all on a certain issue, or his intention might have
been indeterminate. The difficulties obviously increase when we try to identify the intention of Congress or a constitutional convention as a whole, because that is a matter of
combining individual intentions into some overall group intention. Even when each congressman or delegate has a determinate and ascertainable intention, the intention of the
group might still be indeterminate, because there may not be enough delegates holding any
particular intention to make it the intention of the institution as a whole.
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 476 (1981).
Dworkin's own view is that "there is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be
discovered, even in principle. There is only some such thing waiting to be invented." Id. at 477.
See also, e.g., Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982).
Public choice theorists describe the problem of "legislative intent" in different terms:
Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have "intents" or "designs," hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body as
a whole, however, has only outcomes. It is not only impossible to reason from one statute
to another but also impossible to reason from one or more sections of a statute to a problem
not resolved.
This follows from the discoveries of public choice theory. Although legislators have
individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes
impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice. Every system of voting has flaws. The one used by legislatures is particularly dependent on the order in which
decisions are made .... The existence of agenda control makes it impossible for a court-
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ish when the decisionmakers are representatives rather than plebiscite
voters. To be sure, the courts neither know, nor can inquire into, the
often complex motivations of each plebiscite voter.196 But they also cannot know the true stimulus for each representative's vote. 197
Third, representative bodies do not obviously generate a more extensive "record" on each piece of legislation than do plebiscites. Unlike
Congress, state representative bodies produce scant record of the "history" of their enactments. 198 Nonetheless, state legislatures are more
likely than plebiscites sometimes to have official reports of committees
and hearings available for judicial scrutiny. This difference is most important, however, if such reports are necessary for a court to determine
that a challenged piece of legislation is the product of discriminatory intent. And as Part III.B.2 explains, the Court has had little difficulty finding other evidence of discriminatory intent persuasive. Moreover, as the
evidence of discriminatory intent cited in judicial decisions make clear,
there are many respects in which the legislative history of plebiscitary
enactments is both more extensive and more public than that of legislative enactments. 199
Finally, both Bell and Eule appear to consider proof of "a bigoted
decision-maker" to be the central barrier to judicial findings of unconstitutionally discriminatory legislation under modern equal protection doctrine. 20 0 As the next Part discusses, however, the Court's stumbling
block has typically lain elsewhere.
2.

Intent and Modem Equal Protection Doctrine

To the extent that evidence of "a bigoted decision-maker" is central
to finding legislation unconstitutionally discriminatory under modem
equal protection law, the courts have had little difficulty obtaining such
proof in the case of plebiscitary enactments. In Seattle School District
No. 1 v. Washington, for example, several Washington school districts
even one that knows each legislator's complete table of preferences-to say what the whole
body would have done with a proposal it did not consider in fact.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48 (1983). See also, e.g.,
WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 167 (1982); Richard Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 179, 195-96 (1986-87); Mashaw, supra note 117, at 126-27; FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note
6, at 40-42.
196. See supra note 186.
197. Even the representative herself may not always know why she is voting a particular way.
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 529, 536-540 (1982).
198. See supra note 101.
199. See infra Part III.B.2.
200. Bell, supra note 4, at 23-24; Eule, supra note 1, at 1561.
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challenged the constitutionality of a state-wide initiative that effectively
repealed the school districts' voluntarily instituted plans to achieve racial
balance in their schools. 20 1 In assessing the constitutionality of the initiative under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the district court acknowledged that "the secret ballot raises an impenetrable barrier" to any attempt to determine "the subjective intent of the
voters. ' 20 2 The court went on to note that this "does not, however, relieve this court of the burden of determining whether there was in fact [a
racially discriminatory] intent or purpose behind the adoption of Initiative 350. One must simply look elsewhere than within the minds of the
20 3
voters."
The district court in Seattle School Districtthen examined Initiative
350 in light of the five factors that the Supreme Court used to determine
racially discriminatory intent in both Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.20 4 and Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney.20 5 Concerning "the impact of the action," the
court found that "there is a disproportionate impact upon the education
of minority children when their schools are racially imbalanced" and
that the voters "were well aware that the passage of Initiative 350...
could only result in racially-imbalanced schools in [the affected] districts
and a disproportionate impact upon minority students. ' 20 6
When considering "the historical background of the decision," the
court observed that "[t]he very words of the initiative reveal the intent to
frustrate the [racial balancing] plan of the Seattle School Board. ' 20 7 The
court further found that "[i]f implemented, the initiative will achieve that
purpose. ' 20 8 It concluded that "[o]ne must assume therefore that the
voters, in adopting the initiative, intended to accomplish the very purpose for which the initiative was designed and intended therefore the disproportionate racial impact which its implementation will have."'20 9
With regard to the "sequence of events leading up to the adoption of
the initiative," the court noted "a whole series of lawsuits and a recall
election, the objective of which was to prevent the racial balancing of
201. 473
1980), aff'd,
202. 473
203. Id.
204. 429
205. 442
206. 473
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.

F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Wash. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir.
458 U.S. 457 (1982).
F. Supp. at 1014.
U.S. 252 (1977).
U.S. 256 (1979).
F. Supp. at 1015.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND DISCRIMINATION

1991]

Seattle schools.

' 2 10

The court also determined that "the adoption of the

plan of racial balancing by the Seattle School Board was the event which
gave rise to the thought of a statewide initiative as a means of thwarting
'2 11
that decision.
Finally, the court found two "procedural and substantive departures
from the norm" to be critical. 2 12 First, "an administrative decision of a
subordinate local unit of government, the Seattle School Board, was
overridden in a statewide initiative by voters, a great number of whom
were entirely unaffected by that plan."' 2 13 Second, the initiative restricted
the traditional autonomy of local school boards with regard to the as21 4
signment of students.
These factual findings led the district court to conclude that "a racially discriminatory intent or purpose was at least one motivating factor
in the adoption of the initiative," in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 21 5 The U.S. Supreme Court later relied approvingly on the district
court's factual record and use of the Arlington Heights factors in similarly concluding that the initiative at issue violated the Equal Protection
Clause.

2 16

Successful searches for "a bigoted decision-maker" were clearly necessary for both the district court and the Supreme Court in Seattle School
District to find the initiative at issue unconstitutional. But it is the
courts' prior inquiry--determining the particulargroup affected by the
challenged legislation-that is typically the barrier to finding plebiscitary
2 17
enactments invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.
Prior to examining the evidence of racially discriminatory intent,
the district court and the Supreme Court in Seattle School District each
found that the challenged initiative "create[d] an impermissible racial
classification" insofar as it "forb[ade] mandatory student assignments for
racial reasons while permitting such assignments for purposes unrelated
to race."'21

8

Both courts went on to hold (1) that "[n]o compelling state

210. Id. at 1015-16.
211. Id. at 1016.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 465 n.9, 470-84.
217. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105,
1117 (1989). Bell acknowledges this: "Blacks and other minorities will encounter substantial difficulty when they challenge a referendum on race discrimination grounds because... they must show
'that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority.' " Bell, supra note 4, at
24.
218. 473 F. Supp. at 1011 (emphasis added); see 458 U.S. at 470, 474, 485.
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interest justifie[d] that racial classification," and (2) that "[a] racially discriminatory intent or purpose was one of the factors which motivated the
'2 19
adoption of the initiative.
Compare the decisions in Seattle School Districtto the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Crawfordv. Boardof Education.220 Crawford involved
a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to a voter-ratified
amendment to the California Constitution (Proposition I) which "provides that state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or
transportation unless a federal court would [be permitted under federal
decisional law to] do so to remedy a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" to the Federal Constitution. 22'
The Crawford Court sustained the challenged plebiscitary enactment. 222
In contrast to its holding in Seattle School District,the Court in Crawford
found that "Proposition I does not embody a racial classification.' 223 It
noted that Proposition I "neither says nor implies that persons are to be
treated differently on account of their race. It simply forbids state courts
to order pupil school assignment or transportation in the absence of a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. '2 24 The Court added that "if Proposition I employed a racial classification it would be unconstitutional unless necessary to further a compelling state interest. ' 225 The Crawford
Court's finding that the challenged enactment did not classify on the basis of race was dispositive; 226 the presence or absence of a bigoted deci227
sion-maker was irrelevant.
Since the mid-1960s, the Court has been clear that race and a few
other classifications would be accorded strict scrutiny, while others were
to receive reduced scrutiny. 228 By the early 1970s, it was so well estab219. 473 F. Supp. at 1011; see 458 U.S. at 471-72, 485 n.28.
220. 458 U.S. 527 (1982). Scholars and judges have made many creative attempts to reconcile
Crawford and Seattle. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 1, at 1562-67 and sources cited id.at 1566 n.284.
221. 458 U.S. at 529.
222. Id. at 545.
223. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 536.
226. Id. at 536-39.
227. As something of an afterthought at the end of its opinion, the Court did note that the
plebiscitary enactment had neither a "racially disproportionate effect" nor a "discriminatory purpose." Id. at 544-45.
228. Strict scrutiny requires that the governmental action bear a necessary relationship to a compelling state interest. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
Rational basis scrutiny, in contrast, requires only that a governmental action bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 486 U.S.
450, 457-58 (1988); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
And intermediate scrutiny, which the Court introduced in the mid-1970s for sex and legitimacy
classifications, requires that a governmental action bear a substantial relationship to an important
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lished that the level of scrutiny to be applied also dictated the result in
equal protection cases that Gerald Gunther could describe strict scrutiny
as " 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," and rational basis scrutiny as
"minimal ...in theory and virtually none in fact." '229 Over the years, the
Court has been equally clear about the level of scrutiny that laws affecting different groups should receive. 230 Thus, the only remaining-and
therefore the critical-issue in equal protection inquiries has been23identi1
fying the particular group affected by the challenged legislation.
The target of discrimination is sometimes apparent from the face of
a law, as the history of school segregation laws, interracial cohabitation
prohibitions, and antimiscegenation statutes makes clear. 232 Since the
later 1960s, however, laws that discriminate by proxy have largely superseded laws that discriminate against a racial minority on their face. 233 In
theory, the Court could employ a straightforward "disparate impact"
test in these cases. Taken alone, however, this measure of discrimination
is overinclusive. Because of the strong correlation in our society between
race and other traits such as educational level and wealth, 2 34 discrimination on the basis of these other traits could always be construed-and
therefore prohibited-as discrimination on the basis of race. The intent
classificatest enables the Court to distinguish proxies for impermissible
235
classifications.
cohort
benign)
(and
tions from unavoidable
governmental interest. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 & n.9
(1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 1914 (1988);
Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
229. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
230. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 217, at 1117.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., the laws struck down in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); in
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
233. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 217, at 1117-18.
234. As of 1989, the most recent year for which official statistics are available, white households
in the U.S. had a median income of $28,781, compared to a median income of $16,407 for black
households. 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 132, at 451. Even more striking is the racial
disparity in household net worth as of 1988, the most recent year for which official statistics are
available: a median of $43,279 for whites and $4,169 for blacks. Id. at 469.
As of 1989, the most recent year for which official statistics are available, the median black 25
years old and over had completed 12.4 years of school compared to 12.7 years for the median white.
Id. at 138. This statistic embodies the fact that 21.8% of whites, but only 11.8% of blacks, had
completed 4 years or more of college. Id.
235. Ortiz, supra note 217, at 1118. Ortiz also contends that the intent requirement can be seen
"as a response to the rigidification of the suspect classification and tiers of scrutiny stages of equal
protection." Id. at 1117.
Theodore Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson present an important empirical study of "how the
intent standard actually operates" in racial discrimination cases. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1151, 1151 (1991). They concluded that,
[t]heexpert judgment that plaintiffs would have a low success rate in intent cases is not
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Notwithstanding its name, however, the "intent" test of modern
equal protection doctrine frequently has little to do with individual motivation. In areas such as housing and employment in which the intent
test has required plaintiffs to show that race was "a motivating factor" in
the enactment of the allegedly discriminatory legislation, the Court has
been satisfied if a showing of disparate impact is supplemented by a variety of other objective factors. 23 6 The Court has suggested that government officials might be called to testify at trial about their actual motives
only in a few extraordinary cases, and as something of a last resort. 237
In many other areas, the intent test has not required plaintiffs to
make any showing of discriminatory motivation, although it has required
something more than evidence of disparate impact. 238 In jury selection
cases involving both panel selection and venire constitution, the Court
has required that proof of adverse impact be supplemented merely by a
showing that the juror "selection procedure ...is susceptible of abuse or
is not racially neutral. ' 239 In voting cases, the intent doctrine bears even
less relationship to motivation. In this area, the Court has required only
a showing of disparate impact plus a showing that the pertinent jurisdiction has previously engaged in other types of objectively verifiable racial
discrimination.

240

verifiable by observing all published opinions. Intent claimants' success rate is not markedly different from that of other civil rights claimants. The more striking finding is the low
volume of intent litigation. The Supreme Court's standard takes its toll not through an
unusually high loss rate for those plaintiffs reaching trial or appeal, but by deterring victims from even filing claims.
Id. at 1153.
236. These factors include the specific series of events leading up to the challenged action, the
general historical background of the decision, the legislative and administrative history of the action,
and departures from the normal procedural sequence and usual substantive policies followed by the
government decisionmaker. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-48 (1976); Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274-80 (1979). See also Ortiz, supra note 217, at 1110-16,
1134-36.
237. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 & n.18 ("judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government.
Placing a decisionmaker on the stand is therefore 'usually to be avoided' ").
238. See Ortiz, supra note 217, at 1119-36; Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 235, at 1158.
239. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
96 (1986).
240. The Court in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), for example, found discriminatory
intent substantiated by an aggregate of 14 factors having at best an indirect bearing on motivation.
458 U.S. at 623-27.
Dan Ortiz contends that the result of these different burdens of proof in different substantive
contexts is that equal protection doctrine makes judicial review of legislative decisionmaking undemanding in realms (such as housing and employment) in which traditional liberalism relegates decisionmaking to markets. In areas (such as voting, jury selection, and sometimes education) in which
traditional liberalism insists on a nonmarket allocation of goods, however, the same doctrine makes
judicial intervention much more likely. Ortiz, supra note 217, at 1107, 1134-42.

1991)

DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND DISCRIMINATION

In sum, the fact that a plaintiff (or a court) neither knows, nor can
inquire into, the often complex motivations of each plebiscite voter
should not pose an additional or unique barrier to a successful claim
under existing equal protection doctrine. The court's determination of
the particular group affected by the challenged law is often dispositive.
Even when a search for "a bigoted decision-maker" is necessary, however, the courts have had little difficulty obtaining the requisite proof
without the voters testifying about their actual motives.
The above description of modem equal protection doctrine also
highlights the undesirability and unworkability of scholars' recommendations that the courts abandon the intent requirement in equal protection cases involving plebiscitary legislation. 24 1 Were the Court to employ
a straightforward "adverse impact" test in such cases, a wide range of
currently constitutional enactments would be unconstitutional if enacted
by a plebiscite, but permissible if enacted by a representative body. For
example, an initiative (but not a legislative enactment) requiring the local
police department to base its hiring decisions on an aptitude test developed by the Civil Service Commission would now be unconstitutional if
more blacks than whites failed the exam. 242 This would be the result
even if the Court found the test to be "reasonably and directly related to
the requirements of the police recruit training program. ' 243 Similarly, an
initiative (but not a legislative enactment) requiring the state to give an
employment preference to veterans would be unconstitutional, no matter
what its justification, if fewer blacks than whites met this criterion. 244
And an initiative (but not a legislative enactment) prohibiting the rezoning from single-family to multi-family of a 15-acre parcel in the middle of
80 acres of single-family homes, as requested by a low-income housing
development corporation, would now be unconstitutional if the failure to
rezone would (as is likely) bear more heavily on racial minorities. 24 5 In
brief, any plebiscitary legislation that adversely affected racial minorities
would be unconstitutional under these proposals (1) no matter what the
affected "good," and (2) no matter what race-neutral justification would
or could be offered on behalf of the legislation.
A slightly different proposal with the same aim would be for the
Court to employ a sliding-scale intent requirement that made bad motive
241. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 4, at 23-24; Eule, supra note 1, at 1561-62; Gunn, supra note 4, at
154-59.
242. Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
243. Cf Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.D.C. 1972) (citation omitted).

244. Cf Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
245. Cf Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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somewhat easier to prove for plebiscitary enactments than for identical
legislation by a representative body. As the discussion of Seattle above
makes clear, however, the Court has not historically had any difficulty
establishing improper motive in cases involving plebiscitary legislation
that it determines classifies on the basis of race. 246 Rather, the difficulty
lies with the Court's determination of the particular group affected by the
challenged legislation.

247

As an alternative, therefore, one might propose a sliding-scale for
levels of scrutiny such that legislation that currently receives rational basis scrutiny would receive heightened scrutiny if enacted by a plebiscite. 248 Similarly, plebiscitary enactments that currently receive strict
scrutiny would receive "super-strict" scrutiny. The difficulty with this
alternative, however, is that all legislation, no matter what the classification at issue, would receive heightened scrutiny. And, as was discussed
above, the level of scrutiny to be applied has long dictated the result in
equal protection cases, with heightened scrutiny typically being "fatal in
fact."' 249 The result, therefore, is that the courts would invalidate any

and all plebiscitary enactments challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause.
3.

Due Process of Lawmaking

One final aspect of proposals for a harder judicial look at plebiscitary legislation merits discussion. By arguing that the courts should treat
the legislative products of plebiscites and representative bodies differently
because of differences in the two lawmaking processes, these proposals
would start the Court down the slippery slope toward a doctrine of due
process of lawmaking. The Court, however, has almost always declined
to invalidate statutes and constitutional amendments where a denial of
due process of lawmaking is alleged. Indeed, neither the Court nor the
vast bulk of academic commentators has considered due process of lawmaking to be either a workable or desirable doctrine.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 201-216.
247. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
248. Eule, for example, suggests that the courts replace rationality review with heightened endsmeans review when a law is the product of a substitutive plebiscite. Eule, supra note 1, at 1568. He
argues that the traditional deferential approach is premised on the fact that legislatures conduct
hearings and are, in general, more competent factfinders than the courts. Eule notes, in contrast,
"[t]he absence of structured factfinding in the substitutive plebiscite and the dangers of classification
inherent in a process of naked aggregation .. " Id. Heightened scrutiny of plebiscitary lawmaking
would nonetheless be unnecessary, he contends, when "the burden of plebiscitary action falls on
political actors able to defend their interests in the popular arena .... " Id. at 1573. Here Eule has
the vast bulk of economic regulation in mind. Id.
249. See supra note 229.
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In many nations, the courts are empowered to review the lawmaking
process but not the substance of laws that have been legitimately enacted. 210 In the United States, however, the courts largely believe themselves to hold the reverse powers of review. The Court has heard
challenges to many aspects of the process through which particular statutes were enacted, but has scarcely ever found the alleged lack of legislative due process to invalidate the law. 25 1 Even when its rhetoric suggests
that it considers some aspect of the making of a law illegitimate, the
250.

See, e.g., MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 99

n.8 (1971); Gottfried Dietze, Judicial Review in Europe, 55 MICH. L. REV. 539, 541 (1957).
251. The classic discussions of due process of lawmaking are Hans A. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB.L. REV. 197 (1976); and Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975). An important recent contribution is FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note
6, at 118-31. See also sources cited id. at 118 n.4, 119 n.6.
Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey suggest that there are three, non-mutually exclusive models of
due process of lawmaking: structural, procedural, and deliberative. Id. at 118-31. Under the structural model, the court "attempt[s] to protect against governmental abuses, not by substantive judicial
review, but by improving the structure of decisionmaking." Id. at 121. The most notable example of
a decision comporting with the structural model is Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
See also cases discussed in FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 121-22.

Under the deliberative model, the court "require[s] not only compliance with formal legislative
rules, but also evidence that the legislature actually acted with sufficient deliberation." Id. at 122.
Farber and Frickey posit City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989), as an exemplar of this model.

FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 122.

Under the procedural model of due process of lawmaking, "courts would merely require legislatures to follow their own rules." Id. at 125. The most notable such case is Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969). See also cases cited in FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 125-27; Linde, supra,
at 226.
The Court has only rarely employed the structural model of due process of lawmaking to invalidate regulations or statues, and this model is much more controversial than the procedural model
among the justices as well as among commentators. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 11923 ("The [ ] limits [of structural review], let alone [its] ultimate judicial acceptance, [is] highly unclear."); Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV.
809, 823 (1983) ("The difficulty is that no one has yet specified when structural review is appropriate.").
Although the deliberative model of due process of lawmaking has sometimes been suggested by
various justices, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 122 n.31, this model has "the weakest
support in American law," id. at 129, and has scarcely ever been invoked to invalidate an enactment.
Even commentators relatively favorably disposed toward the structural model have expressed
"somewhat greater doubts about the utility of the model of legislative deliberation," id. at 124.
The Court has occasionally been willing to employ the procedural model of due process of
lawmaking to invalidate legislative actions, see id. at 125-27, and some commentators consider these
cases relatively unproblematic, see, e.g., id. at 127 ("uniform enforcement of procedural rules will
tend to produce better results on the average"). The Court has held that legislatures must follow
some form of rational fact-finding in the rare cases in which legislatures adjudicate individual rights,
as in contempt and impeachment cases, and probably when expelling a member. See, e.g., Groppi v.
Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Unites States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 518-20 (1972). See also Linde, supra, at 226.
In addition, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the
Court arguably employed the procedural model in finding the legislative veto unconstitutional.
Although Farber and Frickey make an interesting and thoughtful case that "the legislative veto ran
afoul of all the components of due process of lawmaking," FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 129
(emphasis added), they note both that the "Court did not rely on lack of legislative deliberation," id.
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Court only rarely invalidates the law on that ground. 252
When proposed in the state legislature, a bill is not required to state
a purpose or to recite the "findings" on which it is based. 25 3 It may be
enacted by legislators who have never read it or whose minds are wholly
closed to reasoned argument. 254 Not even the opportunity for debate and
discussion need precede enactment; the New York Legislature once
passed 508 bills in three days. 255 More than one commentator has concluded that "[p]rocedures like these are indefensible when one takes seriously the notion that due process commands a legislature first to agree on
a purpose and then to assess the efficacy of the proposed means to accom''
plish it. 256
Why, then, has the Court historically declined to ensure that legislation is the product of due process? Scholars have often attributed the
Court's reluctance to respect between coordinate branches or to
problems of proof,257 although as Justice (then Professor) Hans Linde

has noted, "[n]either problem keeps courts from insisting on such adherence [to lawful procedures] by executive officers ....,,258
at 130, and that the "effect of the ruling was to require the observance of appropriate legislative
procedures," id. at 131.
Most state courts (and commentators thereon) have found it improper to question legislative
adherence to lawful procedures, although "[]udicial views on allowing a law to be attacked for
faulty enactment differ from state to state and with the nature of the asserted fault .
Linde,
supra, at 242. See also Linde, supra, at 242-43 for additional source citations.
252. The most prominent exceptions are cases in which the Court employs the procedural model
of due process of lawmaking, see supra note 251, and cases in which "the Court's rhetoric suggests a
rejection of interest-group politics as a legitimate basis for legislation." Sunstein, supra note 155, at
53. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55 (1982); and United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
253. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 251, at 226.
254. See, e.g., SENATOR H.L. "BILL" RICHARDSON, WHAT MAKES You THINK WE READ THE
BILLS 36-46 (1978):
Every legislator has his own system for judging how he will vote, but reading the bill
usually isn't part of the procedure, and listening to debate on the bill's merits certainly isn't
either ....
I hope you will have noticed that I haven't mentioned logic and reason as factors in
how legislators vote. In the many years I have served in the state legislature, no one has
ever approached me and stated, "Bill, your premises are inaccurate" ....
255. Briffault, supra note 4, at 1362; RICHARDSON, supra note 254, at 41 (California Senate
voted on 25 bills at one time "late in the session, when things were all jammed up."). See also supra
note 135.
256. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 251, at 226-27; Sunstein, supra note 155, at 53-54. Cf Tushnet,
supra note 251, at 826.
257. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 251, at 243, and sources cited therein at note 117; FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 125.
258. Linde, supra note 251, at 243.
Justice Linde suggests two alternative explanations for the Court's resistance to legislative due
process: First, "the due process clauses do not command compliance with legitimate procedure in
the abstract; they state that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without such
compliance." Id. at 244- 45. Linde terms this "the practical reason to withhold judicial review." Id.
at 245. He notes that "to deny an injured party relief from an improperly made law means either
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More recently, Cass Sunstein has concluded that the Court's unwillingness to supervise the functioning of the legislative process reflects its
"skepticism toward the view that the Constitution forbids legislation that
is based on the power of self-interested private groups. '259 He argues
that the common law equal protection and due process demands that
legislation be "rational" might "be understood precisely as a requirement
that regulatory measures be something other than a response to political
pressure. '260 He adds that "[i]n no modem case has the Court recog-

nized the legitimacy of pluralist compromise as the exclusive basis for
legislation.

' 261

Sunstein acknowledges, however, that this seeming evi-

dence of the existence of a doctrine of due process of lawmaking is undercut by the fact that "[t]he Court is willing to hypothesize legitimate ends
[in order to sustain legislation] even in cases in which it is highly unlikely
that those ends in fact account for [the] legislation .... ",262
The primary reason for the Court's longstanding unwillingness to
ensure that legislation is the product of due process may be more
straightforward, however. A doctrine of due process of lawmaking
would require the Court to specify what legislative process is in fact due,
a task that it may be neither able nor willing to carry out.263 At the very

least, the Court would need to specify the legislative behaviors that due
process would require or prohibit. Making these choices would ultimately force the Court to adopt a particular conception of good government-pluralistic, republican, or something else. None of these
determinations is likely to be easily made or uncontroversial.
Specifying appropriate lawmaking behavior may, in addition, embody seemingly intractable problems of proof.26 4 The Court may, for
that courts will tolerate violations of due process of law, or else that every breach of the prescribed
process does not fall short of due process in the constitutionalsense." Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
Second, Linde contends that "[t]o judge legislation as a process, not as a product, ... requires
[courts] to deny validity to some excellent enactments while sustaining deplorable ones that have
been faultlessly made." Id. at 254. While obviously true if taken alone, this second, alternative
explanation has force only if the Court were completely to substitutejudicial review of the lawmaking
process for judicial review of the legislative product. This is neither the present, nor a probable, state
of affairs.
259. Sunstein, supra note 155, at 66.
260. Id. at 49.
261. Id. at 50.
262. Id. at 53.
263. Historically, the Court has been willing to specify the legislative process that is due only in
the rare cases in which the legislature adjudicates individual rights. See supra note 251.
264. One response to Linde's observation that such problems of proof do not deter courts from
insisting that executive officers adhere to lawful procedures, Linde, supra note 251, at 243, is that
these problems of proof may in fact be greater in the case of legislative process than administrative or
adversarial process because of greater disagreement in the case of the former regarding both the
definition and evidence of "good process."
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example, decide that legislative due process requires that legislators deliberate before voting, or prohibits legislators from responding mechanically to interest group pressures. But what will count as evidence of
appropriate deliberation (or its absence)? What behaviors will signify
that a representative's vote is the prohibited product of interest group
pressures rather than the permitted result of her independent judgment
that the proposed legislation promotes "the public good"?
Even if the Court could coherently specify the legislative process
that is constitutionally required and could further overcome any
problems of proof, the question of desirability remains. Do we really
want the courts directly and explicitly to monitor the lawmaking process? There is reason to think not. First, judicial review of the lawmaking process will not substitute for judicial review of the legislative
product. If we will always want the courts also to engage in substantive
review of legislation, it is not clear that any significant benefit will accrue
from supplemental judicial review of the lawmaking process. 265 If scholars are interested in having the courts review the lawmaking process in
order indirectly to add teeth to currently weak doctrines of substantive
review of the legislative product, they should simply encourage the
courts and/or Congress directly and explicitly to strengthen those substantive doctrines.
Second, to the extent that interest in due process of lawmaking reflects a more general substantive concern that legislative products be
"public-regarding," 266 this concern may be optimally met by not having a
doctrine of due process of lawmaking. Rent-seeking by interest groups
cannot be eliminated without cost, and we should be willing to expend
resources to control the behavior of our representatives "only up to the
point at which the marginal costs of such expenditures equals the marginal benefit in terms of reduced rent-seeking. '267
It is possible that the existing regime provides optimal deterrence of
rent-seeking by interest groups. First, the Constitution currently contains many mechanisms that hinder the passage of special interest legisla265. Supplemental judicial review of the lawmaking process seems likely to have an effect only if
a substantively permissible law is enacted through procedures that are found to have been unlawful.
In this case, an enactment that would have been sustained but for judicial review of the lawmaking
process will be held to be invalid. In the vast majority of cases, however, one would expect a substantively permissible law to have little difficulty subsequently being reenacted through proper legislative processes. "Enacting" the same law twice will, of course, be more costly than enacting it once,
and the additional cost(s) may sometimes deter the sponsor(s) of the proposed legislation from seeking (re)enactment.
266. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 102, at 226.
267. Id. at 245-46.
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tion.268 Indeed, more than one scholar has concluded that "the idea that

the Constitution was designed to impede interest groups from obtaining
economic advantage through political means is 'the most promising candidate for a unitary theory of the Constitution.' ",269 Second, although
the Constitution is rarely used to invalidate statutes (especially economic
ones), 270 Jonathan Macey has shown that the judiciary, "inevitably ...
encourages passage of public-regarding legislation and impedes passage
of interest group bargains" when it employs "traditional method[s] of
statutory interpretation. '27 I Third, since the federal courts depend on
Congress for their jurisdictional authority and, in some cases, very existence, "it is simply unrealistic to think that Congress would permit the
courts systematically to eradicate the rents it receives from interest
groups. ' 272 Thus, Congress may not be willing to tolerate any more judicially imposed impediments to the passage of interest group bargains
than currently exist.
Finally, Einer Elhauge has shown that recent proposals to have the
courts more intrusively review legislation that is the product of "disproportionate interest group influence" are incoherent for at least two reasons. First, "we cannot hope to identify improper interest group
influence by the political methods those groups use," since "there is
nothing distinctive" about those methods. 273 Second, "even an ideally
conscientious and knowledgeable judge will be unable to separate judicial
findings about whether interest group influence is excessive from normative conclusions about how much influence that interest group should
have."' 274 And there is no uncontroversial basis for setting these decisive
baselines. 27 5 Elhauge concludes that "in making the threshold finding
that supposedly narrows their normative discretion, judges will be making precisely the sort of normative judgment that the proposals seek to
limit to a subset of cases. The result is no different than if the judge
'276
applied that normative standard to all cases."

In sum, before the Court accepts scholars' proposals that it treat the
legislative products of plebiscites and representative bodies differently because of differences in the two lawmaking processes, it should need to be
268. Id. at 242-43, 247-50.
269. See, e.g., id.at 249 (quoting with approval Sunstein, supra note 159, at 1732).
270. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 102, at 224.
271. Id. at 226-27; see also id. at 238-41, 250-52, 254-55, 257-61, 263-67.
272. Id. at 242.
273. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive JudicialReview?, 101
YALE L.J. 31, 49 (1991).
274. Id. at 60.
275. Id. at 49-50.
276. Id. at 60.
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persuaded either (1) that a coherent doctrine of due process of lawmaking is both possible and desirable, or (2) that disparate treatment of the
products of different legislative processes does not mandate a larger doctrine of due process of lawmaking. Neither case has yet been made.
277

C. Improving Plebiscitary Procedures

Those who, despite the analysis in Parts I and II above, remain interested in providing racial minorities greater protection from potentially
disadvantageous plebiscitary legislation might most productively focus
their attention on directly remedying any perceived defects or weak278
nesses in existing plebiscitary procedures.
The ability of any minority group to block potentially disadvantageous plebiscitary legislation might be directly enhanced in a variety of
ways. For example, the number of signatures necessary to place a proposition on the ballot could be increased 279 or a geographical distribution
requirement imposed. 280 A supermajority of votes could be required to
277. This section did not exist in the Conference draft of this paper, on which the published
comments of Professors Eule and Riker were based.
This section (and I) profited from my service as an independent commentator on the TIPS Task
Force Report, supra note 39, at the ABA Annual Meeting, August 1992, in San Francisco.
278. Indeed, even those persuaded that a rationally self-interested racial minority's preference
between representative and direct lawmaking processes is a difficult empirical question and cannot
confidently be resolved on the strength of a priori reasoning, may still be interested in improving
various aspects of existing plebiscitary procedures.
For examples of recent, general proposals to improve direct democracy, see DUBOIS & FEENEY,
supra note 143; TIPS Task Force Report, supra note 39.
279. All states that permit initiatives require a certain number of signatures to qualify a measure
for the ballot, but the number of signatures required varies widely among jurisdictions. Compare,
e.g., MASS. CONST. amend, art. LXXXI, § 2 (3% of votes cast in preceding gubernatorial election),
with NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (10% of votes cast in preceding general election).
The signature requirement can pose a real-not just formal-barrier to ballot entry. For example, between 1914 and 1989 in the state of Washington, 551 initiatives were filed with the state prior
to the commencement of the signature collection process, but only 85 (15%) were ultimately certified as containing enough signatures to warrant placement on the ballot. TIPS Task Force Report,
supra note 39, at 22. In addition, a regression analysis of plebiscitary measures qualifying for the
ballot between 1950 and 1980 revealed a strong statistically significant relationship between a state's
signature threshold levels and the number of measures qualifying for the ballot. MAGLEBY, supra
note 1, at 41-44. This relationship was found to be stronger for initiatives than for referenda. Id. at
42.
Although the TIPS Task Force concluded that "there is no optimal percentage of signers that
will ensure appropriate use of the plebiscite," it acknowledged that "the signature requirement could
affect the costs of the plebiscitary process significantly, and that higher requirements could help to
limit plebiscites to situations of legislative failure." TIPS Task Force Report, supra note 39, at 2223.
280. At present, several states require that the signatures necessary to qualify a proposition for
the ballot be collected from a cross section of the state. See, e.g., Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 50 (signatures required from 8% of the voters in each of two-thirds of the state's congressional districts);
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 4(2) (signatures required from 5% of the qualified electors in each of at
least one-third of the legislative representative districts); NEB. CONST. art III, § 2 (signatures required from 5% of the electors of each of two-fifths of the counties of the state); MASS. CONST.
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enact initiatives. 28 1 The governor could have the power to veto plebiscitary enactments, 28 2 and the state legislature could have the power to
amend or repeal them. 28

3

It is important to remember, however, that

any change in the plebiscitary process that makes it easier for a minority
group to block potentially disadvantageous legislation will simultaneously make it more difficult for the minority group to pass potentially
28 4
advantageous legislation.
Those concerned to increase the likelihood and quality of plebiscitary deliberation also have a wealth of options. States could send pamphlets to all registered voters 30 days prior to each election, which set
forth: (1) the ballot title of the proposition, (2) a clear, readable summary
statement of the proposal, (3) an explanation of the effect of the proposal
and of an affirmative and a negative vote, and (4) advocacy statements by

amend. art. 48, gen. prov., pt. 2 (no more than one quarter of the required signatures may be of
registered voters in the same county).
Geographical distribution requirements are typically thought to help ensure both that issues of
purely local concern are not subsidized by the state and that various localities do not impose a
disproportionate burden on another locality. See, e.g., TIPS Task Force Report, supra note 39, at
23-24. In addition, however, the requirement also makes signature collection more expensive and
difficult, "especially if it imposes an obligation to collect signatures in rural areas where relatively
few signatures can be obtained per work-hour invested in the collection process." Id. at 24.
281. Denmark, Scotland, and Wales all have de facto supermajority requirements in the guise of
"qualified majority requirements whereby 30-67 percent of the electorate (all eligible voters) must
vote affirmatively for a measure to pass." MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 89.
Some American states and localities already require more than a simple majority of affirmative
votes to approve referenda on issues such as bonded indebtedness and incorporation, respectively.
Id. at 47. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that supermajority requirements are not inherently
unconstitutional. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); Mihaly v. Westbrook, 403 U.S. 915 (1971).
Lani Guinier has recently proposed supermajoritarian decision-making rules and weighted voting within representativebodies "to give minority groups an effective veto, thus forcing the majority
to bargain with them and include them in any 'winning' coalition." Guinier, Seats, supra note 74, at
1503.
282. At present, no governor has a veto power over statutory or constitutional initiatives. See
supra note 21. "In most states, successful initiatives are automatically implemented within ninety
days of the election" unless a legal challenge is pending. MAGLEBY, supra note 1, at 47.
283. In approximately half of the states that currently permit statutory initiatives, the legislature's ability to amend them is restricted. Id. at 47. Frequently, any legislative amendment (including repeal) of a statutory initiative must be submitted to a popular vote. Id.; see also, e.g.,
ARiz.
CONsT. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 4. In other states, the legislature can amend or
repeal a statutory initiative, but only by a two-thirds vote of all members, see, e.g., ARK. CONST.
amend. 7, or only three years after the initiative's effective date, see, e.g, NEV. CONST. art. XIX,
§ 2(3).
Noting that "the risk that the legislature will spitefully overturn a popularly elected measure is
effectively countered by a desire for political self-preservation," the TIPS Task Force recommends
that statutory initiatives be treated the same as legislative enactments two years, after their effective
date, but that amendments or repeal by a supermajority of the legislature should be permitted prior
to that. TIPS Task Force Report, supra note 39, at 55-56.
284. See supra Part I.
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proponents and opponents of the proposition. 28 5 Prior to each plebiscite,
the state could also hold public debates or hearings involving both proponents and opponents of each ballot proposition. 28 6 In addition, voter understanding of plebiscitary proposals might be improved by: requiring
that the title and text of each ballot proposition be reviewed by an appropriate state official for misleading or confusing language, 28 7 by limiting
each ballot proposition to a single subject, 288 by limiting the number of
propositions on the ballot in any given election, 28 9 and by requiring dis290
closure of a proposition's sponsor(s).
Finally, those concerned that well-funded organizations may find it
easier to "buy" plebiscitary than legislative enactments that disadvantage
racial minorities could pursue campaign finance and disclosure laws that
are at least as stringent as those for candidate elections. 291 (This concern
might also be assuaged by recent empirical findings that: (1) campaign
spending was the decisive factor in only 12 percent of all state-level initiative campaigns during 1976-1984,292 and (2) heavy expenditures have
been successful in persuading people to vote against an initiative, but
285. For a good overview of current state practices, see TIPS Task Force Report, supra note 39,
at 27-37.
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that voter pamphlets may be seldom read and quickly
discarded, see, e.g., Eule, supra note 1, at 1508-09, surveys in several states indicate that "where
voter pamphlets are available, voters claim to read some or all of them and consider them a valuable
resource in helping them decide how they will vote." CRONIN, supra note 1, at 81.
The TIPS Task Force concluded that the level of use "could profitably be increased by making
pamphlets more readable," and that "the state has an obligation, as a matter of principle, to place
relevant information concerning ballot propositions before the voters." TIPS Task Force Report,
supra, note 39, at 30.
286. At present, only a few states hold hearings or debates on ballot propositions. California law
provides for, but does not mandate, such hearings. See TIPS Task Force Report, supra note 39, at
38. In Colorado, initiatives proposed to amend the constitution, are submitted to the legislative
research and drafting offices of the general assembly, which subsequently report their comments at a
meeting open to the public. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl.5. A bill was introduced into the Nebraska legislature in 1991 that would require the sponsor of record of an initiative to hold at least
one public hearing in each congressional district in the state between the 15th and 60th day prior to
the general election. Neb. bill 585, Legislature of Nebraska, 92nd Legislature, 2nd Session (1991).
287. At present, initiative petitions can be circulated only after a state official approves their
language, although the identity of the official and the stringency of the review differ among the
states. TIPS Task Force Report, supra note 39, at 11-19.
288. See supra note 39. No state currently appears to have a limit on the number of propositions
that may appear on a given ballot, and the TIPS Task Force found the issue "insufficiently problematic to raise the difficult questions that any limiting legislation would entail." Id. at 47-48.
289. Id.
290. For a good overview and normative analysis of current state practices, see id. at 62-65.
291. The TIPS Task Force notes that some of the justifications for campaign contribution restrictions may apply with less force in the plebiscitary setting where "the outcome of the election is
to enact a new law, not to place any person in a position to reward contributors." Id. at 59. For a
good overview and normative analysis of the widely varying current state practices, see id. at 56-65.
292. SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 35-37.
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have had a negligible effect on obtaining affirmative votes. 293 )
CONCLUSION

There are obvious and important differences between the representative and plebiscitary lawmaking processes. Even if these differences did
cause plebiscites to be systematically more likely than representative bodies to enact legislation that disadvantages racial minorities, that finding
should not mandate either the abolition of plebiscites or any alteration in
standards of judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment. I have
demonstrated, however, that a rationally self-interested racial minority's
preference between representative and direct lawmaking processes is a
difficult empirical question and cannot confidently be resolved on the
strength of a priori reasoning.
That the question turns out to be hard should not surprise. Rather,
it is precisely what we should expect given that approximately half the
states have provided for some form of plebiscitary lawmaking while a
nearly equal number of states has not. 294 As Saul Levmore has argued in

a wide range of other contexts, "variety among legal systems often arises
in rules that either (a) do not much matter or (b) raise issues about which
reasonable people (even in the same culture) could disagree. ' 295 Both
possibilities are borne out in the present context.
As the analysis in Part II shows, even those interest groups most
likely to fear majority oppression cannot conclude a priori that a representative lawmaking process is preferable to a plebiscitary one with regard to any given piece of legislation.296 In this respect, the lawmaking
293. Id.; Lowenstein, Campaign Spending supra note 4, at 511.
As Farber and Frickey note, summarizing the empirical findings of Schlozman and Tierney, the
influence of an interest group on Congress is similarly "likely to be strongest when the group is
attempting to block rather than obtain legislation." FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 19 (discussing KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1986)).

294. See supra note 1.
295. Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 44 (1987); see also, Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and
Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1986); Saul Levmore, Waiting
for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations,
72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986).
296. It is important to note that I am not claiming normative indifference, from the perspective
of general social welfare, between representative and plebiscitary lawmaking processes as to the "default" legislative process. There are obvious and good reasons-having nothing to do with the likelihood that legislation that disadvantages racial minorities is enacted-to prefer that representatives
make the vast bulk of our laws. Many of those same reasons may help to explain why we have
plebiscites at the state and local, but not the national, level.
In addition, as is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 140-41, individual interest groups
have several reasons to channel their lobbying efforts toward representative lawmakers over the long
run.
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options that a state provides should not much matter. Whether a state or
municipality is generally better off with or without plebiscitary supplements to its representative lawmaking processes, however, is a different
question that raises issues about which reasonable people could-and
do--disagree.
All the same, we should beware the possibility that legal scholars'
nearly unanimous distrust of direct democracy-and faith in the courts'
ability to remedy any deficiencies--evinces an unjustified and dangerous
elitism. If the ordinary citizen cannot be trusted to make the laws by
which she will be governed, why should she be given the responsibility of
electing the representatives who will make those laws? Indeed, why
should we leave the important task of lawmaking to representatives
elected by the masses when an appointed bevy of Platonic Guardians is
available to do the job?
Ironically, the Supreme Court has never shared these scholars'
views of either the Court or the People: The Court has never varied its
analysis because of a law's popular origin. Rather, consistent with the
analysis presented in this Article, the Court has long subscribed to Justice Black's view that constitutional provisions for direct democracy
"demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or
prejudice.

'' 297

297. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).

